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CONTENTS

EDITORIAL	1
THE QUEST FOR FREEDOM WITHIN THE CHURCH IN COLONIAL AMERICA	Winthrop S. Hudson 6
AMERICAN FREEDOM AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH	John W. Shepard, Jr. 16
ROMAN CATHOLIC PRESIDENT IN THE AMERICAN SCHEMA	Richard C. C. Kim 33
FROM BARMEN (1934) TO STUTTGART (1945): THE PATH OF THE CONFESSING CHURCH IN GERMANY	Franklin Hamlin Littell 41
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY	Paul Geren 53
BOOK REVIEWS:	
Geigley, Gustave, S. J., <i>Faith and Understanding in America</i> By Edwin S. Gaustad	71
Nichols, Roy F., <i>Religion and American Democracy</i> By J. D. Bragg	73
MacAvoy, Thomas T., C. S. C. (Editor), <i>Roman Catholicism and the American Way of Life</i> By Paul F. Boller, Jr.	75
Morrison, Clinton D., <i>The Powers That Be</i> By Heber F. Peacock	78
White, Norman, <i>Religion, Politics, and the Higher Learning</i> By Leonard A. Duce	79
Quianbeck, Warren A. (Editor), <i>God and Caesar: A Christian Approach to Social Ethics</i> By E. Earl Joiner	83
Marth, Karl, <i>Community, State, and Church</i> By David L. Mueller	84

Moskowitz, Moses, *Human Rights and World Order*
By Ralph L. Lynn

Cronon, E. David, *Josephus Daniels in Mexico*
By Lyle C. Brown

Brookes, Edgar H., and Macauley, J. B., *Civil Liberty in South Africa*
By H. Dicken Cherry

Bainton, Roland H., *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*
By Olin T. Binkley

Wild, John, *Human Freedom and Social Order: An Essay in Christian Philosophy*
By John P. Newport

Littell, Franklin Hamlin, *The German Phoenix*
By William A. Mueller

Spector, Ivar, *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1958*
By Guy Bryan Harrison

Yates, Gerald F. (Editor), *Papal Thought on the State*
By William A. Mueller

Wishy, Bernard (Editor), *Prefaces to Liberty: Selected Writings of John Stuart Mill*
By William G. Toland

Muelder, Walter G., *Foundations of the Responsible Society*
By John B. Davidson

Niebuhr, Reinhold, *The Structure of Nations and Empires*
By Guy H. Ranson

Thompson, Kenneth, *Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy*
By Erwin C. Buell

NOTES ON CHURCH-STATE AFFAIRS

CONTRIBUTORS AND REVIEWERS

EDITORIAL

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

Without question, the greatest single issue before mankind today is human freedom, and freedom is the real issue in the relationship between church and state. In America the separation of church and state was established as the guarantee of the principle of religious freedom, and the pattern of relationship in the United States found classic expression in the phrase "a free church in a free state."

Freedom nourishes the aspirations of men everywhere. Yet the paradox of today is that in all human history the threat of totalitarianism has perhaps never loomed larger. The twentieth century has witnessed to an alarming degree the rise of powerful nation states which have increasingly demanded supreme allegiance and authority over their citizens. This new challenge, which has all the earmarks of a religion, may best be termed statism. Its essential doctrine, simply stated, is the exaltation of the state to supreme authority and the demand of a loyalty which supersedes all other loyalties. Opposition to the state is at best viewed with suspicion, and at its worst is regarded as the greatest moral and political evil one could commit. The cults and sects of statism are numerous—communism, fascism, Nazism, imperialism, and even, on occasions, democracy. Statism becomes evident in each case whenever the state becomes the supreme value and object of supreme loyalty.

Reinhold Niebuhr was quoted in *Time* magazine a few years ago: "If one may judge by the various commencement utterances . . . Americans have only one religion: devotion to democracy. They extol its virtues, are apprehensive about the perils to which it is exposed, pour maledictions upon its foes, rededicate themselves periodically to its purposes, and claim unconditional validity for its ideals." Certainly statism wherever found has its requirements of worship and ritual, its processions, its pilgrimages, its holy days, its temples, its shrines to the prophets of the past, its mythology, and its gospel of faith. Emil Brunner has rightly cautioned us that "to think of democracy and totalitarianism as opposites is just as wrong as to identify totalitarianism with dictatorship. State-totalitarianism is not a form of government. The form of a state decides how and by whom political power is to be wielded." The real point is that the exaltation of the state, even in a democratic

form, is always a threat to freedom and the exercise of religious faith.

There can be little question but that the right of dissent is seriously threatened in our American democracy today. Recently Carlton J. H. Hayes has reminded us in his book, *Nationalism: A Religion*, of a famous case in New York City. The Committee on Studies and Textbooks declared: "The textbook must contain no statement in derogation or in disparagement of the founders of the Republic or of those who have guided its destinies . . . the dominating spirit of the Revolution is found in the words of Nathan Hale: 'I regret that I have but one life to lose for my country.'" The attitude reflected in this famous report is apparently widely held. There are many ominous signs which suggest that intimidation of individuals and groups is commonly practiced by rightist societies and individuals against all those who would criticize the state or national policy. The National Council of Churches comes under repeated attack for assuming that it has a right to speak out on national and international issues in terms of what the Council regards to be the social implications of the Christian faith. Jewish groups are often smeared as left-wing when they boldly seek to defend individual rights in a manner harmonious with the spirit of their Jewish faith. There is evidence of renewed intolerance against all political dissenters, and present attempts at character assassinations are far too common. Certainly statism poses a threat even within the United States.

Obviously, the challenge of statism is not resolved merely by the establishment of the principle of the separation of church and state. For example, the Soviet Union has decreed the separation of church and state, but has denied the right of the church to be free. In many ways, statism is a far greater threat to the free church and the free state in America than is clericalism. To be sure, statism is a threat to both the state church and the church state. Statism always seeks the subordination of the church to the state, and the prostitution of religion merely to further national and political ends. Statism thereby ultimately threatens the very existence of the church and denies the right of religion to demand the supreme allegiance of its adherents. Meanwhile we do well to remind ourselves that at the present moment, the most dynamic forces in human history are undoubtedly to be found in movements that are primarily political rather than religious.

This issue of *A Journal of Church and State* is concerned particularly with religious freedom. Appropriately, Winthrop S. Hudson, a distinguished church historian and scholar, has sought to examine the theological roots of religious liberty in America in his article, "The Quest for Freedom Within the Church in Colonial America." The author points out that America's colonial forebears profoundly understood that obedience to God requires freedom to respond to Divine rule. They came to be committed to the "defense of religious liberty as an inalienable and God-given right of all men everywhere." This article was delivered this spring as the first of a series of lectures at the Second Annual Conference on Church and State at Baylor University. The lectures are known as the Dawson Lectures on Church and State.

Professor Hudson is a new member of the Editorial Council of this journal and is a well-known author of numerous books on church history. To students of church and state he is perhaps most recently known as the author of *The Great Tradition of the American Churches* (Harpers, 1953) and *Understanding Roman Catholicism* (Westminster, 1959), which was reviewed in the last issue of this journal. A similar study, *Understanding Protestantism*, is to be published this year. He is also one of the contributors to *Roman Catholicism and the American Way of Life* (Notre Dame Press, 1960), which is reviewed in this issue (pp. 75-77).

In "American Freedom and the Christian Faith," John W. Shepard, Jr., explores the humanistic and secular influences which have contributed to the American concept of freedom and the somewhat secondary influences that Christianity has provided. The author calls for a reappraisal of our concept of freedom and American democracy in terms of three fundamental Christian concepts: the will of God, personality, and community.

The author has served for almost eleven years as a Baptist missionary in Japan. He represents a growing number of missionaries who are particularly concerned over the relationship of Christianity and culture in today's world. He makes apparent his conviction that culture must receive its norms from the Christian revelation. The church, therefore, must somehow break through the molding influence of culture and nationalism, the movement toward which would result in perversions of the Christian faith.

Richard C. C. Kim, Assistant Professor of Government at the University of Oklahoma, continues the dialogue concerning the election of a Roman Catholic as president of the United States.

Taking note of the article by Robert A. Baker, "The Presidency and the Roman Catholic Church," which appeared in the last issue of *A Journal of Church and State* (November, 1960), Professor Kim analyzes the possibility of the election of President Kennedy as further evidence of a "continuance of social and doctrinal schism of the Catholics from Rome." The author observes that "the occupancy of high public offices by churchmen has had a tendency to weaken the influence of the church to which the occupants belonged, not to strengthen it."

Statism perhaps found its most extreme expression with the establishment of the Third Reich by Adolf Hitler in 1933. Familiarly known as Nazism, this state cult demanded nothing less than the complete deification of the state and the subordination of the church and all religion for political ends. "From Barmen (1934) to Stuttgart (1945): The Path of the Confessing Church in Germany," by Franklin Hamlin Littell, is a painful reminder of the ultimate ends to be sought by statism in completely subjugating the church unto itself. It still seems incredible that such a phenomenon could and did occur in this generation. The significance of this study is heightened also by the fact that much of the information herein has not previously been made known in English.

The author, who is Professor of Church History at the Perkins School of Theology of Southern Methodist University, has made significant contributions to the study of church and state, especially to the study of the free church. His recent publications include: *The Free Church* (Beacon, 1957); *The Anabaptist View of the Church* (Beacon, 1958); and more recently *The German Phoenix* (Doubleday, 1960), which is reviewed in this issue (pp. 97-99). It is a pleasure also to announce that Professor Littell is now a member of our Editorial Council.

A second case study of statism appears in the final article, "Church and State in the United States and the Soviet Union: A Comparative Study," by Paul Geren. The author notes that in both of the two most powerful nations in the contemporary world the separation of church and state and religious liberty are expressly assured. In America there is separation, but a friendly attitude is maintained by the state toward the church; whereas in the Soviet Union there is separation, but a hostile attitude toward religion is officially and actually maintained by the state against all religion. Therefore, Dr. Geren incisively probes beyond the

"words to the acts, the laws, the customs, the way of life in the United States and the Soviet Union."

The author has had a distinguished career in foreign service. Sent to Burma by the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society, he taught at Judson College in Rangoon until World War II interrupted his service there. He has described his experiences in the well-known and widely-read book, *Burma Diary*. For a number of years he served with distinction with the United States State Department in the Near East and later as Deputy Director of Near Eastern Affairs. Later as Executive Vice President and Director of Foreign Studies at Baylor University, he inaugurated the J. M. Dawson Studies in Church and State, which is responsible for the launching of this publication. Long a student of foreign affairs, the author spent the summer of 1959 touring Russia and subsequently did research on the Soviet Union at the Institute of Russian Studies at Columbia University. This article was written and submitted for publication while Dr. Geren was Executive Director of the Dallas Council on World Affairs, a position he has just resigned in order to return to service with the State Department. It is, therefore, with profound regret that we accept his resignation from the Editorial Council of the *Journal*. For his vision, enlightened leadership, generous support, and wise counsel, we shall always remain deeply grateful.

J. E. W.

THE QUEST FOR FREEDOM WITHIN THE CHURCH IN COLONIAL AMERICA*

WINTHROP S. HUDSON

While there were many factors in colonial America which spurred the development of an ever-broadening policy of religious toleration, full religious liberty was not won without a struggle. Considerations of expediency, dedicated by the pressure of minority groups demanding freedom for themselves, were perhaps the most important of all the factors which led to the adoption of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This constitutional guarantee, however, was made more secure by those who buttressed the counsels of expediency with a persuasive defense of religious liberty as an unalienable and God-given right of all men everywhere.

Among the groups which helped blaze the way to full religious liberty, the Baptists were the most notable in this latter respect. As a minority group, to be sure, they sought freedom for themselves; but they rendered a far more important service by insisting that the freedom they claimed for themselves must be equally shared by others. The great service of the Baptists was to clarify for all Protestants the implications for liberty of theological convictions which they held in common. Religious freedom, they insisted, was not a mere practical necessity; it was a necessity implicit in the very foundations of the Protestant understanding of the Christian faith. Viewed from this perspective, religious freedom was a fundamental principle of government which was to be defended as a right for all people everywhere. So persuasive were the Baptists at this point, that the guarantee of religious freedom embodied in the Constitution received the far more important sanction of being engraved in the hearts and minds of most Americans as well.

The whole structure of religious freedom, from a theological point of view, is based upon an understanding of the implications of Christian obedience for the shaping of the political order in a fallen world. Before attention is directed to the political order, however, it is necessary to consider the way in which this understanding of Christian obedience shaped the pattern of church life.

*Lecture delivered at the Second Annual Conference on Church and State, sponsored by the J. M. Dawson Studies on Church and State at Baylor University, March 13-16, 1961.

I

Isaac Backus was the master strategist who directed the Baptist campaign for religious freedom in the decades immediately preceding the adoption of the Federal Constitution. One of his major contributions to this campaign was his history of the Baptists which detailed the oppressions and indignities to which the Baptists had been subjected. As an astute controversialist, Backus began his history of the Baptists with an account of the founding of New England. This tactic could be and has been interpreted as a bid for sympathy from those who were persecuting the Baptists by reminding them that once it was their forebears who were the persecuted and oppressed. But Backus had something more in mind than a mere bid for sympathy. His initial sentence informs us that "to obtain clear and just ideas of the Baptists in New England," it is necessary "to look back to its first settlement and carefully to examine what were the sentiments and character of the original planters."¹ This was necessary because Backus believed the Baptists to be the true heirs—in terms of their fundamental convictions—of the earliest settlers. "In general, their [Baptists'] faith and practice come the nearest to that of the first planters of New England of any churches now in the land, excepting in the single article of sprinkling infants."² Furthermore, Backus insisted, the "oppression on religious accounts" in which the Congregationalists had indulged "was not of the first principles of New England, but was an intruder that came in afterward."³

From an examination of the basic documents of the two groups, it is clear that the Baptists were the heirs of the Congregationalists in terms of their understanding of the nature, constitution, and structure of the church. For example, when the Baptists adopted a revised *Westminster Confession* as their own statement of faith, they not only accepted the rephrased article on the church from the *Savoy Declaration* of the Congregationalists, but they also incorporated in the article "the platform of government" which the Congregationalists had appended to the *Savoy Declaration*.⁴ Furthermore, when the Baptists in America spelled out their practice of church government in the *Discipline* of 1743, they directed the

¹Isaac Backus, *A History of New England with Particular Reference to the . . . Baptists* (Newton, Massachusetts, 1871), I, 1.

²*Ibid.*, II, 232.

³*Ibid.*, I, viii.

⁴Williston Walker, *Credo and Platforms of Congregationalism* (New York, 1893), pp. 403-408.

attention of the reader to the writings of such eminent Congregational divines as Thomas Goodwin and John Owen for further explication of their practice. While there can be little doubt that the Baptists were heirs of the early New England tradition, the point Backus was seeking to make was that in their concern for religious freedom they were the *true* heirs, representing the *true* line of descent, for he believed that New England Congregationalism had departed in significant fashion from its first sentiments and practice. His task, as he saw it, was to recall the Congregationalists to their earlier obedience.

Obedience is the key word. A common conviction of both Congregationalists and Baptists was that "the Lord Jesus calleth out of the world . . . those that are given unto him by his Father, that they may walk before him in all the ways of obedience which he prescribeth to them in his Word."⁵ To be truly obedient, in terms of their understanding of the personal character of the Christian faith, they were convinced that it was necessary that they should be fully persuaded themselves that the obedience which they were to give was the obedience which Christ required of them. This, of course, was no more than a basic Reformation tenet. Martin Luther had insisted that everyone must do his own believing in the same way that everyone must do his own dying. "You yourself must decide," he had said; "your neck is at stake."⁶ In similar vein, an Edwardian bishop had declared:

It is not enough for you to say that you believe as the church of the elect and chosen of God believe, unless you know and feel in your heart what thing it is that the church believeth. Your faith must not be grounded upon any other man's faith, but upon Christ only . . . Believe not the doctrine because I or any other preacher doth preach it unto you; but believe it to be true because your own faith doth assure you it to be true.⁷

No second-hand faith, no proxy religion, would do. Everyone must be persuaded for himself that the obedience he yields is the obedience which Christ requires of him.

This insistence upon the necessity for a personally apprehended

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 403. W. J. McGlothlin, *Baptist Confessions of Faith* (Philadelphia, 1911), p. 265.

⁶Wilhelm Pauck, *The Heritage of the Reformation* (Boston, 1950), pp. 5, 20.

⁷Winthrop S. Hudson, *John Ponet: Advocate of Limited Monarchy* (Chicago, 1942), p. 41.

understanding of Christ's will for his people was a potentially explosive element in any attempt to establish a pattern of religious uniformity. In 1571, for example, a committee of the English Parliament drafted a confession of faith which omitted the consecration of bishops and some similar items. Archbishop Parker immediately demanded an explanation of the omissions. Peter Wentworth, speaking for the committee, replied that these matters had been omitted because the members had not yet made up their minds as to whether or not they were agreeable to the Word of God. "But surely," said the archbishop, "in these things you will refer yourselves wholly to us, the Bishops." Whereupon Wentworth replied with some warmth that "they meant to pass nothing they did not understand; for that would be to make the bishops into popes."⁸ This was the spirit that had been generated by the Protestant Reformation in England, and it was a spirit that in the end was to lead to civil war.

The emphasis was upon obedience; and to be obedient one must be free to obey. John Robinson, pastor of the Pilgrim congregation at Leyden, has emphasized this point in words recalled by Isaac Backus. "We may not," he said, "stint or circumscribe either our knowledge, faith, or obedience," and therefore we may not "suffer ourselves to be stripped of any liberty which Christ our Lord hath purchased for us and given us to use for our good."⁹

This concern for freedom to obey God was the foundation of the common heritage to which Backus appealed in his pleas for liberty, and it found expression in an endeavor to carve out an area of freedom within the church itself. This was the origin of the congregational polity which was to become such a marked feature of American life. Its purpose was not to permit individual congregations to follow their own whim and caprice, but rather to allow them full liberty to obey God. Church order must be so constituted that each member of the church would be free to obey God according to the dictates of his own conscience.

II

The concern of the early Puritans to be fully obedient Christians had involved many of them in a conflict with the existing church. When urged to adjust themselves to the requirements imposed by ecclesiastical authority, they replied that the Protestant

⁸R. B. Perry, *Puritanism and Democracy* (New York, 1944), p. 111.

⁹Backus, *op. cit.*, I, 5.

Reformers had taught them that even General Councils may err and that there is no infallible judge on earth in matters of faith and practice. Therefore, instead of yielding obedience to ecclesiastical authority, they had to be obedient to their own consciences as they were enlightened and illumined by reading the Bible. Much as they esteemed the Reformers, they were forced to confess that even the Reformers were fallible men who saw not all things that God requires of his people. Said John Robinson:

I cannot sufficiently bewail the condition of those Reformed Churches which are come to a period in religion, and will go at present no further than the instruments of their reformation. The Lutherans cannot be drawn to go beyond what Luther saw. Whatever part of his will our God has revealed to Calvin, they (the Lutherans) will die rather than embrace. And the Calvinists, you see, stick fast where they were left by that great man of God, who yet saw not all things. That is a misery much to be lamented.

Robinson was determined that this blind faith which yields obedience to men rather than to God should not be true of the little company that was setting sail to establish the colony at Plymouth. He had been their pastor, and his parting word to them was a word of admonition.

I charge you, before God and his blessed angels, that you follow me no further than you have seen me follow the Lord Jesus Christ. If God reveal anything to you by any other instrument of his, be as ready to receive it as you were to receive any truth by my ministry, for I am verily persuaded the Lord hath more truth to break forth out of his holy Word.¹⁰

This had been their mandate from the beginning. The problem was to carve out an area of freedom so that they would be at liberty to yield this full obedience to God as he made himself known to them.

The whole course of English religious policy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was toward a greater degree of toleration and freedom, but this fact can be somewhat misleading for it was not an uninterrupted progression and at times the latitude allowed was narrowly circumscribed. Pressures for conformity were sporadically applied under Elizabeth, somewhat more consistently under James, and finally with full rigor under

¹⁰Cotton Mather, *Magnalia Christi Americana* (Hartford, 1855), I, 64.

Charles and his ecclesiastical lieutenant William Laud during the fateful decade of the 1630's. It was this pressure for conformity rather than the intermittently expanding toleration that posed a problem for those who did not see eye to eye with the authorities and yet were determined to be faithful and obedient Christians. The problem was to find an area of freedom which would permit them to yield the necessary obedience to God.

Their attention was focused initially upon the church, and their concern was to find freedom within the church to obey God. The big obstacle which stood athwart their path was the authority of the bishops, for the bishops had been given responsibility for enforcing conformity. As a consequence, when local congregations began to feel the heavy hand of episcopal repression, they acquired an acute distaste for bishops. Furthermore, their historical memory, which ran back to the burnings under "bloody Mary" and was nourished by tales of the Inquisition and the slaughter of St. Bartholomew's Day, had taught them that ecclesiastical tyranny was more to be feared than anything else. Thus it seemed to them, with the transformation of the bishops into "lordly prelates" who insisted upon obedience to themselves rather than to the World of God, that the whole machinery of ecclesiastical tyranny had been reestablished.

The "cause of all this misery," William Ames asserted in his preface to Paul Baynes' *The Diocesan's Trail*, "is the lifting up of a lordly prelacy upon the ruins of the churches' liberties."

How intolerable a bondage is it, that a minister, being called to a charge, may not preach to his people except he hath a license from the bishop; cannot receive the best of his congregation to communion if he be censured in the spiritual courts . . . nor keep one from communion that is not presented in those courts . . . and must oftentimes (if he will keep his place) against his conscience put back those from communion with Christ whom Christ doth call unto it . . . What a burden are poor ministers pressed with in that . . . they must hurry up to the spiritual court on every occasion, there to stand with cap in hand, not only before a bishop but before his chancellor, to be railed on many times . . . to be censured, suspended, deprived, for not observing some of those canons which were of purpose framed for snares, when far more ancient and honest canons are every day broken by these judges themselves for lucre sake.

The task, as these men saw it, was to eliminate the possibility of this episcopal tyranny by so reconstituting the church that the

bishops would be stripped of their power to coerce the consciences of those whose only fault was their endeavor to be obedient Christians.

The two points at which the power of bishops was exercised were ordination and excommunication. By virtue of their power to ordain, bishops were able to withhold godly ministers from a congregation and to force the acceptance of unworthy and unwanted ministers in their place. To prevent this, it was insisted that a minister derives his outward authority not from a bishop but from the call of the congregation. In like manner, to prevent Christians from being coerced into unwarranted and ungodly practices by the power of excommunication wielded by bishops and their courts, it was insisted that if anyone were to be subjected to the terrible penalty of being delivered to Satan it must be done not by some distant bishop but by those who knew him best, by his own fellow believers in his own congregation. This, of course, is the essence of a congregational church polity—the restriction of the powers of ordination and excommunication to the local church. The concern was to carve out an area of freedom within the church so that full obedience could be yielded to God.

It is interesting, in connection with this concern for freedom, to note the way in which they appropriated an argument drawn from the field of judicial procedure to justify the limitation of the power of excommunication to the local congregation. An analogy was drawn to the right of an accused person in a civil offense to demand a trial by a jury of his peers in his own neighborhood. "We of this nation" have always admired "the care and wisdom of our ancestors herein, and do esteem this privilege of the subject . . . as one of the glories of our laws and do make boast of it as such a liberty and security to each person's life as (we think) no nation about us can show the like." These are the words of Thomas Goodwin and Philip Nye in their preface to John Cotton's *The Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven*. Is it not evident, they asked, that the higher the judicatories are, "the further are they removed from the people . . . and disabled thereby from that precise practical knowledge of fact and frame of spirit in the person transgressing?" In judging a man, they asked, is not this knowledge of fact and knowledge of the spirit of the accused quite as important as a knowledge of the law itself? They then posed the question: If the sentencing of an individual to a temporal death be thus safeguarded, is not such a safeguard

equally necessary when the person accused is threatened by a decree of eternal damnation? With all these questions answered in the affirmative, their contention that a person could only be excommunicated by his fellow believers in his own congregation seemed unassailable.

There were two groups of these early Congregationalists—the Separatists and the non-Separatists. The latter were those who found that they could adjust their consciences sufficiently to conform in matters indifferent, while they continued to labor to reform and remodel the English church into an essentially congregational establishment. The others were those who, under the pressure of a demand for a more rigorous conformity, felt compelled to establish separate congregations in order to maintain a pure worship. When they did separate, they were careful so to construct their independent church life that there would be no opportunity for an ecclesiastical tyranny—whether of bishops or synods or presbyteries—to develop. No less than the like-minded who remained within the established church, they were insistent that the primary instruments of church power—ordination and excommunication—be reserved to the local congregation.

III

Conditions of life in the American colonies tended to reinforce and strengthen this congregational type of church polity. For one thing, "the free air of a new world," where people were far removed from traditional authorities and dependent for survival upon their own unaided efforts, generated a sturdy independence of spirit and a marked aversion to being pushed around by anyone. This might be a less worthy motive than the desire to be free in order to yield a full obedience to God, but it contributed to a climate of opinion that provided support for an emphasis upon the freedom of a local congregation.

Another circumstance which fostered a congregational type of polity was the simple fact that in the colonies a new beginning had to be made. This new beginning was always in terms of the formation of local congregations. No presbytery, no synod, no episcopal diocese could be formed until first there were local churches. Thus only after a lapse of time could an effort be made to draw these churches into some sort of a traditional connective relationship. These initially independent self-governing units proved to be highly resistant to subsequent attempts to regularize their

status by subordinating them to a wider ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

Among the Anglican churches in Virginia, for example, actual control fell into the hands of lay vestries which had the power to hire the minister and to determine his salary, a situation which was justified by noting that "the parishioners were the founders of the churches, having built and endowed them."¹¹ It was this type of spirit within their own ranks, more than anything else, which frustrated Anglican attempts to establish an episcopate in America throughout the colonial period. William White, who was himself destined to become a bishop after the close of the American Revolution, declared in 1782 that "there cannot be produced an instance of laymen in America, unless in the very infancy of the settlements, soliciting the introduction of a bishop," the "great majority of them" being convinced that it would be "an hazardous experiment" which would "jeopardize their prerogatives."¹² Even the episcopacy which ultimately came into being with the formation of the Protestant Episcopal Church in 1789 was more an episcopacy in name than in fact, so few were the powers that the bishops possessed. It was also insisted that no powers be delegated to the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church save those which could not be exercised by the clergy and laity in a local congregation. The other denominations, Roman Catholics included, were to be characterized for a long period of time by a similar high degree of localism which served to counter the exercise of any arbitrary ecclesiastical authority.

As a consequence of these circumstances of life in a new world, all the denominations, whatever their ostensible polity, tended to become in fact, if not in name, congregational in their church government. The motivation was less theological and more mundane than that exhibited by the early Congregationalists and Baptists, but the results in guaranteeing a high degree of local independence were much the same.

Unfortunately, this congregationalism provided no real solution to the problem of providing for the possibility of a free and unconstrained Christian obedience. The endeavor of Congregationalists and Baptists to carve out an area of freedom *within* the church had been at the same time both successful and abortive. It had been successful in that almost all American churches be-

¹¹E. H. Davidson, *The Establishment of the English Church in Continental American Colonies* (Durham, N.C., 1936), p. 20.

¹²H. Richard Niebuhr and Daniel D. Williams, eds., *The Ministry in Historical Perspectives* (New York, 1956), p. 213.

came basically congregational in government. It had been abortive in that there was a basic contradiction involved in the effort to find an area of freedom within a church. Christian obedience demands not only freedom but also limits and boundaries. A church cannot tolerate an unlimited and unbounded freedom and still remain a Christian church. Some things are required if it is to preserve its Christian character. A line must be drawn somewhere, and this line may run counter to what someone else regards as involved in his Christian obedience. The necessary freedom thus becomes a freedom to leave a church. What is required is a freedom outside the church, and not within. Even Robinson himself, Backus noted, had been forced into "separation" from the existing church,¹³ which meant that he had been forced to seek freedom without rather than within the church.

Subsequent experience in New England where Congregationalism reigned supreme had demonstrated very clearly to Backus and to others that the problem of freedom to obey God was not basically an ecclesiastical problem but a political problem. Ecclesiastical authority became tyrannical and unbearable only when it was coupled with the coercive powers of the state. This was the problem the Baptists had encountered, and it emphasized that the decisive need was to strip the state as well as the church of coercive powers in matters of faith. Thus the logic of Protestantism, with its emphasis upon obedience to the dictates of a personally apprehended faith, led not necessarily to congregational independence but rather to the separation of church and state. The ultimate consequence, where the implications of Protestant presuppositions were consistently pursued, was to be full and complete religious freedom.

¹³Backus, *op. cit.*, I, 3, 5.

AMERICAN FREEDOM AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

JOHN W. SHEPARD, JR.

It is evident that, from the beginning of our national history, Christian ideas have played an important role in the development of the American tradition of freedom. It is necessary only to recall the contribution of the Puritans and Roger Williams in the foundation of American freedom to give some indication of this influence.¹ Yet it is also evident that the American tradition of freedom is not essentially Christian. Because of the close relationship of Christian ideas to the development of democracy in America, there is a tendency to associate these two elements uncritically, thus identifying the Christian faith with observable weaknesses in the democratic process. It is more accurate to say that the Christian contribution is secondary, the more direct influence being the rationalistic humanism of classical Greek thought and the Enlightenment, which continues as the dominant element in the American democratic faith.² It is the problems in this philosophy which primarily lead to the problems in the American idea of freedom. It is with a brief critical appraisal of this philosophy and its problems that we must begin our evaluation of the possible Christian contribution to the development of American freedom today.

From the Christian point of view, the humanistic basis for freedom is inadequate in at least two points. First, it involves an unrealistic estimate of human nature, the emphasis on the essential goodness of man. The uncritical acceptance of this view in American life led to vast abuses associated with unregulated capitalism in the past, and is the root of a naive faith of some in "social planning" in our day. In both cases, the assumption is that men will put the general welfare above selfish motives. It is true, as one writer has pointed out, that in actual practice American democracy has tended to restrict selfish impulses,³ but the idea of essential human goodness still plays an important role in the American consciousness. Again, the humanist position fails to furnish a

¹For a general discussion of the relation of Christianity to American democracy, see Arthur E. Holt, *Christian Roots of Democracy in America* (New York: Friendship Press, 1941).

²Cf. John W. Shepard, Jr., "The Background of American Freedom," *A Journal of Church and State*, I (November 1959), 1f.

³Elton Trueblood, *The Life We Prize* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1951), pp. 72, 73.

sufficient moral ground for the application of the idea of freedom. By its very nature, humanism involves ethical relativity, in that there is no ground beyond human reason to which to appeal. The fact that human reason itself is relative undermines any position with regard to freedom that the humanist may take. An indication of the relativism in the humanistic ethic is seen in the fact that communism is derived from the humanistic tradition in the West, yet maintains an attitude with regard to freedom diametrically opposed to that of traditional humanism.⁴ If ideas of freedom are based primarily on humanistic assumptions, their dynamic will be ultimately dissipated in intellectual confusion and moral uncertainty.

Historically, the Christian contribution to the development of human freedom has been to provide moral certainty and spiritual dynamic. Being reconciled to God, the Christian has made the will of God his own, and in certain situations he must obey God rather than man.⁵ This has meant that Christians have felt justified in disobeying law and authority when these have been in conflict with the Christian conscience. This operation of the Christian moral conscience has had an important role in the creation of human freedom through the centuries. Not only does the Christian conscience provide a bulwark for freedom in its resistance to undue authority, it also creates a restlessness with anything less than the full realization of freedom. The tension between the realities of a sinful world and the Christian ideal for human society becomes the dynamic necessary for the achievement of freedom. It is not surprising that those areas of the world where the greatest progress has been made in human freedom are those in which the Christian ideal has most deeply penetrated.

In considering the relationship of the problem of freedom and the Christian faith in the American context, we recognize that freedom is in a critical state, both in America itself and in its relationship to a divided world. Freedom is the very essence of the American creed; yet many Americans have lost conviction regarding the value of freedom as a way of life.⁶ This lack of conviction, in contrast with the passionate faith of the communists, threatens the loss of the moral leadership of democracy,

⁴Cf. Emil Brunner, *Christianity and Civilization* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), I, 98 ff.

⁵E. D. Martin, *Liberty* (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1930), pp. 46-48.

⁶For a discussion of this tendency, see A. I. Abell, "The Religious Aspects" in *What America Stands For*, edited by Stephen A. Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimmons (Fort Wayne, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), pp. 183 ff.

especially in those countries where it is not well-established. Furthermore, the freedom so honored in American precept is often neglected or negated in practice, raising serious questions about the sincerity of the American creed. Our question is, What is the relationship of the Christian faith to this crisis of freedom? What, if any, are the special responsibilities of American Christians in regard to this problem? We shall view this relation and responsibility in terms of three fundamental Christian concepts: the will of God, personality, and community.

I. FREEDOM AND THE WILL OF GOD

In the Christian view of man, the principal fact is not freedom but man's relationship to God.⁷ The first thing that must be said about man is that he belongs to God, his creator, and that the sovereignty of God finds real expression in human life. Human freedom in the Bible is seen entirely in terms of God's sovereignty. Renunciation of God's rule for self-determination is pictured as the primal sin, and acknowledgment of God's control and human dependence the only way to true freedom. But such dependence upon God does not imply servility, for the sovereignty of God must find expression in man in a way which corresponds to the nature of God—in other words, in love.⁸ It is only in freedom that man can do God's will as a loving creature who obeys his own free will. God is sovereign, but his control over man is not absolute. God is related to creation, the world, and man, and within this relationship takes place the drama of freedom and love.⁹ According to the Christian view, then, freedom is founded upon God's love, and is a gift of God. To be free means to be that for which God created us.

In modern times the Reformers, especially Luther, placed especial emphasis on the Biblical view of freedom. However, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the rationalistic humanism of the Enlightenment gradually replaced Christian theism as the basis of the concept of freedom in the West.¹⁰ At first, and as late as the time of Jefferson, traces of theism remained in the concept, in the "nature's God" of the Deists. How-

⁷Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), I, 13ff.

⁸Emil Brunner, *Justice and the Social Order* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1945), pp. 55 ff.

⁹Nicholas Berdyaev, *Slavery and Freedom* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), p. 85.

¹⁰Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, I, 22 ff.

ever, even this attenuated theism finally disappeared, and the idea of freedom became essentially a humanistic ideal. There is an unbridgeable gulf between the Biblical concept of freedom and the classic statement of John Stuart Mill in the middle of the nineteenth century.¹¹ Since that time freedom has come to mean simply human autonomy, and discussions of freedom have had largely to do with how to secure the maximum of self-determination, particularly in the political and economic spheres. With the loss of its theistic basis, the idea of freedom lost its moral significance and profundity of meaning.

From the Christian point of view, the separation of the concept of freedom from its relationship to the sovereignty of God is ultimately disastrous. In claiming absolute freedom for himself, man loses his freedom. The disastrous consequences of the loss of the theistic basis of freedom in the modern age can be seen in the development of a false liberalism (*laissez-faire*) on the one hand and of totalitarianism, both fascistic and communistic, on the other.¹² The effect of the recognition of God's sovereign will in the resistance to forces opposed to freedom was demonstrated in the failure of the Hitler regime in Germany to impose absolute control on the churches of that country. Without the recognition of the authority of God as its basis, any concept of freedom is subject to relativism, and men turn away from freedom to some new authority.¹³ That is why the Christian emphasis on the sovereignty of God is absolutely necessary to the recovery of the true perspective in the contemporary crisis of freedom.

In the early years of American history, God had an important place in the life and thought of the people. Perhaps it was the dominant Puritan influence and the harsh realities of their lives which led Americans in the colonial period to think of God as a sovereign ruler.¹⁴ Their proximity to nature brought them a deep sense of their dependence upon God, and Calvinism solidified their thought in terms of the sovereign-subject relationship. For many of the founding fathers it was the remote Being of the Enlightenment who gave victory in the Revolution and whose guidance was invoked in the councils which established the Re-

¹¹Paul Tillich, "Freedom in the Period of Transformation" in *Freedom: Its Meaning*, edited by R. N. Anshen (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940), pp. 127 ff.

¹²Brunner, *op. cit.*, pp. 135 ff.

¹³Berdyaev, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

¹⁴H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Kingdom of God in America* (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1937), ch. 2.

public, but for the great hosts of common people it was the sovereign ruler of the Puritans. The idea of "this nation under God" continued to wield a strong influence in American life during the years before the Civil War. The expansion toward the Pacific was thought of under the grandiose concept of "manifest destiny," with the connotation that it was God's will that the nation should stretch from ocean to ocean. As the issue of slavery moved toward the "irrepressible conflict," both accusers and defenders called upon God to justify their positions.¹⁵ So vivid was the reality of God at this time that such groups as the Millerites and Mormons thought they saw "the coming of the Lord." Whatever might be said about inadequacies and distortions of understanding, the sovereignty of God was a tremendous reality in the thought and life of the American people in the early period of the national development.

The transformation of American society following the Civil War had a profound effect upon the idea of God and His reality. The new industrial and urban civilization facilitated the development of materialistic values and preoccupation with economic and social problems. This affected American Christianity, particularly in its liberal Protestant branch, in the emphasis on the "social gospel," the application of the Christian ethic to the new social and economic developments. There was a perceptible change in the idea of God, from that of a sovereign ruler to benevolent father. In fact, it was more in terms of the human Jesus than of a sovereign God that the social gospel took its bearings.¹⁶ The center of interest was on the social teachings of Jesus, and the movement in Christian thought was away from dependence on God to the possibilities of salvation by human effort. The Christian ethic became hardly distinguishable from humanistic idealism, and indeed there were attempts to harmonize it with prevailing ideas of socialism. Only the disillusionment following the First World War and the despair that came in the wake of the "great depression" destroyed the uncritical idealism of the prewar period and brought a new emphasis on the sovereignty of God and the reality of evil.¹⁷ The moral confusion resulting from the more recent

¹⁵*Ibid.*, ch. 4

¹⁶C. H. Hopkins, *The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), pp. 130 ff.

¹⁷Cf. Martin E. Marty, *The New Shape of American Religion* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1958) for a devastating analysis of the materialistic tendency in contemporary American church life.

world conflict and subsequent "cold war" has further undermined confidence in humanistic idealism.

In spite of a new interest in "religion" in America in recent years, it is apparent that our society is increasingly controlled by secular and material standards.¹⁸ The loss of the consciousness of God has meant a corresponding loss of moral direction, of the sense of destiny which was characteristic of America in its earlier years. When all is said about the dangers of self-righteousness and spiritual blindness involved in the concept of "this nation under God," it is evident that belief in the ultimate value of its ideals and in the nation as custodian of those ideals is necessary for the preservation and propagation of the American concept of democracy. There are indications, however, of a general loss of direction and moral confusion in contemporary American society. These have been brilliantly analyzed in recent studies of American social character by David Reisman, in which he points out that the tendency in American morals is away from "inner-direction" to "other-direction."¹⁹ By this he means that Americans tend more and more to take their cues for conduct from their "peer-groups" in society and from media of mass communication than from any established moral standard. Reisman does not equate "inner-direction" with religious morality, but there is an evident historical relationship.

The existence of this moral uncertainty obviously makes difficult a positive presentation of American beliefs, either in words or practice. This may be seen in American foreign policy, which tends to be a policy of expediency.²⁰ Much of the vagueness associated with the concept of freedom held by Americans today arises from a corresponding vagueness with regard to its moral assumptions. The question arises in the minds of many non-Americans as to why Americans are concerned about freedom. Is it an absolute value, or something to further American interests? Does it mean true economic and political liberation, or just a cloak to further a type of imperialism? It is true that former Secretary of State Dulles and others have sought to give a sound moral basis to American diplomacy. However, it is equally true that America speaks with many voices in domestic and foreign affairs. These

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹David Reisman and associates, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 36 ff.

²⁰Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), pp. 72 ff.

many voices in a sense reflect the operation of democracy; but in another sense they reflect a serious moral confusion.

The recovery of moral unity and a sense of destiny appears as the fundamental problem in American life today. The Christian believes that these qualities are derived only by the recognition of and dependence upon the sovereign will of God in human affairs.²¹ The American people need to understand that freedom is not a "natural right" but a gift of God. They need to see with greater clarity the power of God over human life and His moral will at work in the world. Only in the strength of this knowledge will freedom be guarded from moral relativism and cynicism, forces more dangerous to the existence of freedom than any political or military threat. The recovery of a theistic foundation is, of course, primarily the responsibility of American Christians and churches. Only when the Christians of America center their lives in a vital experience of God and the churches become dynamic channels of that experience will the force of God's will be communicated to American society as a whole. However, the tragic fact is that God as a vital reality is absent not only in the lives of many Americans in general, but also among many American Christians. The spirit of materialism and secularism is found among those who profess belief in God, many times in an undifferentiated sense from those who do not. This spirit has not only impregnated the lives of many church members, but of many churches, dominating their activity and outlook. The experience of God in the lives of many Christians has come to be associated exclusively with the worship services in the churches and seems far removed from daily activities. Thus there is first a need for personal and social repentance among Christians, of a recovery of God's reality and His moral demands, before they may become channels for the spiritual dynamic necessary for the continued existence and creative application of freedom in America and throughout the world.

II. FREEDOM AND THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF PERSONALITY

Jesus brought a revolutionary concept of personality into the world of his day. It was a world in which many were slaves, a world of racial animosities, a world of princes and beggars. It was a world in which little value was attached to personality as such.

²¹Cf. Roger L. Shinn, "The Christian Gospel and History" in *Christian Faith and Social Action*, edited by John A. Hutchinson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), pp. 33 ff.

Whatever value a person had was relative to his station in life. If a person were born a slave or became one, he had little chance of ever becoming more than the property of another. The Jew hated the Gentile, and vice versa. The beggar on the street was worthy only of neglect, or at best momentary pity. A woman was forever subject to the whims of some man. In the attitude and teachings of Jesus there was a radically different view of personality.²² It was of the very essence of Jesus' religious faith that God cares for men separately. He was the first to truly recognize that every man has worth of his own and is not a superfluous unit in the mass. Men do not exist for other men, or for the community they live in, or for humanity as a whole. They are God's children, each of them by personal right, and every one of them has a value of his own.

The revolutionary concept of personality in the Christian faith has direct implications for ideas of freedom. The capacity for deliberate choice is an essential part of what is meant by man's being made in the image of God. If we look at the teachings of the early church as seen in the writings of the apostle Paul, it is true that we do not find the concept of freedom that we have today.²³ Paul did not advocate, for example, immediate freedom of slaves or "equality" for women, but the teaching that in Christ "there is neither male nor female, bond nor free," served as a leaven that became a powerful factor in the impulse toward liberation in our modern world. However, it must be emphasized at the beginning that there are no implications here of autonomous and irresponsible freedom. In the Christian conception of personality there is a marvelous balance of freedom and dependence, which are tied together in the root of man's personal existence, in his relation to God.²⁴ The unconditional commandment of love protects everyone from the claim of domination on the part of others. But in the Christian conception of man there is found not only equal dignity, from which independence arises, but also unlikeness, from which mutual dependence follows. This freedom for oneself is achieved only by achieving freedom for others, and mutual responsibility is a necessary condition for true freedom. Thus the Christian is committed to seek for men the opportunities of self-determination in every area of life, even while he knows that the only perfect freedom is in the service of God.

²²E. F. Scott, *Man and Society in the New Testament* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), pp. 10 ff.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 236 ff.

²⁴Brunner, *op. cit.*, pp. 138, 139.

The problem of freedom with regard to human personality, from the Christian point of view, arises when man is severed from his theistic roots, when his dependence upon God is removed. In the humanistic view which dominates the modern concept of personality, man is autonomous, and freedom is a condition of his autonomy. But the autonomy of man has led in the modern world, on the one hand, to an extreme self-centered individualism which has emphasized individual rights more than obligations, and, on the other hand, to the alienation and depersonalization of man in modern mass society. The fact is that, once freed of his relationship to God, man will do what he pleases. And once the value placed upon men as the children of God is removed, respect for personality as such soon disappears. The low estimate on personality under totalitarian regimes in recent years may be directly related to the denial of God in the totalitarian philosophies.

In the context of American democracy, the dominant humanistic concept of personality has created serious problems for freedom. The application of this concept in the Declaration of Independence and subsequent American thought has been the assumption that, given the protection of his "natural rights" by government, the citizen will naturally create a good society.²⁵ It is true that there has been some modification in this belief in recent years, but it continues as an essential element in the American idea of freedom. The Christian idea of personality differs from this traditional American idea in at least two points. One is that men are not autonomous, that they are creatures of God and that they sin against God. Therefore they cannot be expected to create a good society without controls. A second point is the Christian emphasis on obligations along with rights, a corollary of the balance previously mentioned in the Christian faith between ideas of freedom and dependence. As Trueblood has pointed out, in actual practice American democracy has recognized the sinful tendency in man and need for checks on the human lust for power. It has also, particularly in the last sixty years, given greater emphasis to the area of obligation in programs of social welfare. But the idea persists when we speak of human freedom of the autonomous man, free of personal obligations to others and limited only by others' rights.

The problem of freedom in relationship to personality in Ameri-

²⁵H. Richard Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

can democracy today can be most clearly seen perhaps in the struggle of Negroes to attain equal rights, particularly in recent years. It is not our purpose to go into a lengthy discussion here of the so-called "Negro problem," but as Myrdal has strongly emphasized in his eloquent and exhaustive treatment of the subject, the present condition of the Negro in America is a patent contradiction of the American creed of democracy and freedom.²⁶ This contradiction has been recognized from the earliest years of American history, and there has been a growing sentiment among American people in recent years to remove it. There is no doubt that considerable progress has been made in recent years in securing full freedom for the Negro, indications of which are seen in Civil Rights legislation, the Supreme Court decision of 1954 calling for integration of public schools, and directives which removed in effect all racial segregation within the armed forces. However, strong opposition to these measures and other efforts to apply the American democratic ideal to this problem by the forces of "white supremacy" indicate that the *status quo* will not be given up without a struggle. Even Southern liberal leaders insist that the problem cannot be solved by legislation alone. Certainly there is a danger involved in the whole democratic process in the enforcement of laws in direct opposition to the "consent of the governed," even when these laws are designed for the freedom of certain people. The real solution lies therefore in moral persuasion, based on an appeal to the American ideal of freedom and personality.

The creation of a moral conscience with regard to a change of attitude becomes a serious responsibility for American Christians and churches.²⁷ No Christian who considers the concern of Christ for people as persons can be satisfied with the present status of Negroes in American society. Nor will he passively allow the situation to remain as it is. It is interesting to note that, in the Negro movement for equality in recent years, the leadership has been largely in the hands of ministers, and the appeal has been on the basis of Christian conscience. It is also true that there has been a growing concern among white church leaders, as seen in the denunciation of segregation and a challenge to its member churches to strive for integration by the National Council of Churches a

²⁶Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1944).

²⁷Cf. Buell G. Gallagher, *Color and Conscience* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1946); also Guy B. Johnson, "Freedom, Equality and Segregation" in *What America Stands For*, pp. 35 ff.

few years ago.²⁸ However, the vast majority of the members of Christian churches are either indifferent to the situation or uphold the position of "white supremacy." The most serious indictment against American Christians lies in the fact that the churches, especially in the South, positively support segregation as a principle in all their activities. Such an attitude on the part of Christians and churches not only invalidates the American claim to freedom among the nations of the world, but seriously undermines the Christian witness in non-Christian countries. Christians in America must become aware of the meaning of Christ's evaluation of personality in its relation to the racial situation. They must understand that in Christ there are no distinctions. Not even "separate but equal" ideas can be tolerated, for in divine love there can be no stopping short of full and complete fellowship. It is only when American Christians become fully aware of these facts that a moral impetus will be provided for the realization of full freedom and personality for all people in America, of whatever race.

In the creation of this moral dynamic, two Christian emphases in regard to personality are relevant: the recognition that man is a sinner, and the belief in the redemptive quality of divine love. The first provides a realistic perspective for the problems; the second creates the moral tension necessary in seeking solutions. Thus, in his approach to the concrete problems related to human freedom, the Christian must recognize that, while sinful limitations in human society will necessitate "contingent solutions," the operation of divine love acts to create a discontent with anything less than satisfactory solutions to the problems involved. In this connection, the *attitude* of the Christian is of supreme importance. Bennett has suggested that the attitude which grows out of genuine Christian experience has three fundamental elements: humility, which is an awareness of one's own sinful limitations; sensitiveness, which means an awareness of the other person's needs; and commitment, the commitment of self, whatever it costs, in the service of God.²⁹ With humility, sensitiveness, and commitment, the Christian in America will be prepared to confront any problem he may face regarding human freedom and the full development of personality.

²⁸Walter W. Sikes, "Race Relations and Civil Rights" in *The Church and Social Responsibility*, edited by J. Richard James (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1953), p. 86.

²⁹John C. Bennett, *Christian Realism* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), p. 31.

III. FREEDOM AND CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY

The relationship of freedom and community has become a crucial problem in the present age. In the ancient world the right of the individual was submerged in the right of the community.³⁰ After the Renaissance and Reformation, the right of the community yielded to the right of the individual. The emphasis upon individual rights in modern western society led to the development of human freedom, but it meant at the same time a serious loss of community. This has become critical because of the increasing complexity and interdependence in the modern world. The fact that in modern society the individual is oriented more and more in the secondary-group world, where relationships tend to be casual and contractual rather than communal, creates in individuals the sense of being lost in the mass.³¹ In this industrial, urban world the concept of community becomes extremely vital, and any effort to create community will have great appeal. Since individualism and freedom in mass society have meant the loss of community, the current longing for community may be expressed in a willingness to sacrifice freedom in order to achieve it. The question as to whether freedom and community can be achieved together thus becomes a critical matter for American democracy today.

The creation of free community evidently involves the free response of individuals. The coercive creation of community, as in the totalitarian states, obviously negates the possibility of freedom-in-community. Thus the creation of a free community cannot depend upon scientific techniques such as social planning, but must rely basically upon the voluntary participation of responsible individuals. It is not fundamentally a political or economic problem, but a matter of the spirit and of morality. Here the Christian concept of community and the role which the Christian faith may play in the creation of freedom-in-community become relevant. The questions of the relationship of Christianity to culture and the application of the Christian ethic to social life have been subject to a variety of interpretations throughout the history of Christianity.³² However, it is clear that the main stream of Christian

³⁰Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

³¹For a discussion of the contractual basis of relationships in contemporary society, see Pitirim A. Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age* (New York: E. P. Dutton Company, 1941), esp. pp. 167 ff.

³²H. Richard Niebuhr analyzes these various points of view in his *Christ and Culture* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1951).

thought affirms that the only true community is the community of believers; that is, the real communion can be created only on the basis of faith in Christ. Thus a distinction is always maintained between the Kingdom and the world, and no illusion is entertained of the realization of the ideal community in history. On the other hand, Christians are required to be the leaven in society, and the community of believers is given the task of reaching into every area of social life and recreating itself in every part of the world. Thus the Christian faith is at the same time realistic in regard to the impossibility of the achievement of true community in history and conscious of its responsibility to strive for such community.

A necessary approach to the Christian concept of community is in its relationship to personality. There is no dichotomy between the personal and social in the Christian life. For the Christian, ideas of personality and community are but two aspects of the same relationship. Personality is inconceivable apart from communion, and the Christian personality can be fully expressed only in community. As a result, Christianity combines, in a remarkable way, concern for the uniqueness and ultimate worth of every individual with concern for the community of persons. The love that is central in the whole New Testament is love directed toward individual persons, and yet it is a love which binds them together in a community. The radical individualism of the gospels is closely united with the emphasis upon the Kingdom and upon the Church, which have a strong social reference.³³ Yet the individual person is the ultimate unit of moral and religious decision. It is the Christian conviction that without inward change all outward reform would not only be futile but dangerous. From this point of view, any doctrine or society is wrong in which subordination of the individual to the welfare of the community is not corrected by the belief that the welfare of the community has no meaning apart from the dignity of individual persons.

Here the relationship of the Christian concept of community to freedom becomes evident. In fact, no better definition can be given to the Christian community than that which Brunner has furnished, which is "freedom in fellowship, fellowship in freedom."³⁴ Here, too, we see the relationship of love and freedom in the Christian concept of community. For if the individual is called into fellowship-in-freedom, it is love which creates this

³³Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 167, 168.

³⁴In *Justice and the Social Order*, p. 68.

fellowship. In the measure in which love increases in any social organism, it will hold together without coercion. If coercion is constantly necessary, it is proof that the social organism has not evoked the power of love. A writer who was not a Christian, but was nevertheless concerned about the spiritual aspect of the problem of freedom, stressed the necessity of love to free community, and has traced the kinship of these two forces to a common etymological root.³⁵ It is not surprising that hate rather than love is the dynamic force in the creation of the totalitarian community. Hate is the normal atmosphere of coercion, just as freedom thrives naturally in an environment of love.

The creation of a free community has become the crucial test for democracy, in America and in the world. The peculiar responsibility of the Christian is in the creation of the kind of fellowship within the churches which will attract people from all groups into the community of faith and demonstrate the reality of Christian community. Ideally the church is the "community of believers," and the primitive Christian churches were not ecclesiastical organizations so much as communities.³⁶ The degree to which churches today have become more organizations and less communities is the degree to which they have become separated from their original functions of fellowship and cooperative endeavor. In seeking to create community in American churches today, Christians encounter many serious problems. Perhaps the most general is the proliferation of denominations in the American scene, evidence of broken fellowship and community. Within churches themselves there is not only racial exclusiveness already noted, but the tendency toward division along the lines of social class. Christ came to preach the gospel to the poor, but in America the churches, and particularly the established churches of the Protestant tradition, have increasingly become identified with the upper and middle classes.³⁷ There are difficulties for American Christians and churches in overcoming barriers of culture and nationality in the creation of a world community of faith. Before the Christian church can make a real contribution in the creation of true community in society as a whole, it must seek earnestly to demonstrate within itself the reality of Christian community.

³⁵Russell Davenport, *The Dignity of Man* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1955), p. 271.

³⁶Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 178 ff.

³⁷Cf. James H. Nichols, "Secularism in the Church" in *The Challenge of Our Culture*, edited by Clarence T. Craig (New York: Harper and Bros., 1946) p. 193.

Beyond the creation of Christian community within the churches, however, Christians have the responsibility of infusing Christian ideas of community in all their social relationships.³⁸ Though the Christian knows that he cannot hope for the full realization of Christian community within history, he feels the necessity to work for such community, knowing that only in Christian community motivated by love is freedom-in-community ultimately possible. He knows that he lives in a mixed society in which only a minority are committed to Christian standards. He knows that the alternatives between which he must choose are often limited and morally ambiguous because of the corporate sin which he himself shares. Yet he believes that, just as he may be redeemed from his sin by faith in Christ, so he must become an instrument of God for the transformation of society through the practice of Christian principles within social institutions and programs. He may emphasize proximate goals, or what Dr. J. H. Oldham has called "middle axioms," which are implied in Christian faith and love, in relation to the actual situation in which he lives.³⁹ As the American Christian seeks to apply these principles in society, however, he encounters a myriad of practical problems, both in America itself and in relations with other nations. How, for example, can community be created in the political life in America, where "pressure groups" are in a continuous struggle for power? How is he to deal with the problem of the "mass man" in modern industrial society, the man of the cities who lives a lonely, meaningless life among the millions?⁴⁰ It is only when the mass man knows himself as a child of God and as a member of a genuine community that he will recover his sense of spiritual and social significance. Partial solution may be found in programs of personnel management and group dynamics, but the ultimate solution is through a more active outreach of the church into the office and factory, through lay fellowship and witness.

When the American Christian looks beyond the borders of his own land and considers the difficulties in the creation of world community, the responsibilities become even more involved. Certainly an important area of this charge is to set forth the truth

³⁸William Temple, *Christianity and Social Order* (3rd. ed., London: SCM Press, 1950), pp. 25 ff.

³⁹For a discussion of Oldham's "middle axioms," see John C. Bennett, *Christian Ethics and Social Policy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), pp. 77 ff.

⁴⁰Emil Brunner discusses the rise of the "mass man" in *Justice and the Social Order*, chap. 19.

that Americans are but stewards of God in the possession of their vast material and spiritual resources, and that they cannot escape the obligation to use these resources for the establishment of an adequate economic existence and peace in the world.⁴¹ American Christians should lend their active support to specific political programs and organizations working for world community, though at the same time being objectively critical of such programs and organizations, especially at the point of the "utopian idealism" which commonly characterizes them.⁴² Americans need constantly to be reminded of their tendency to look at relationships with other nations from the point of view of self-interest. The Christian experience of sin and redemption furnishes the humility and objectivity which makes such self-judgment possible. But the most direct contribution which American Christians can make in world community is in their active interest in the creation of world Christian community, and specifically in the world missionary task. Here more than evangelism in its narrow sense is meant, for the Christian faith can serve to dissolve cultural and national barriers. American Christians can learn from Christians of other nations what they may do together in the creation of world community. An important function of the missionary may be as a mediator of understanding in the spirit of Christ among nations and cultures.

It is clear that the individual Christian, unless he is a person of unusual influence in national and world affairs, can hope to do little individually in the infusion of Christian community into social life. There are specific areas in which individual action may contribute to the solution of the larger issues of community, as seen in the effect of the demonstration of Christian love by pastors in East Germany in dissolving the animosity of certain Communists.⁴³ However, the struggle in effecting the Christian idea of community in the broad areas of social life is necessarily a collective task, and thus the task of the Christian churches. As custodians of this task, the churches must not separate the fellowship of the church from their common life, and they must not leave their common life out of the church. Above all, Christians

⁴¹The role of the Christian in programs of economic assistance is discussed in W. G. Muelder, *Religion and Economic Responsibility* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), esp. pp. 244 ff.

⁴²Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christian Realism and Political Problems* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953) on "the illusion of world government," pp. 15 ff.

⁴³See John C. Bennett, *The Christian as Citizen* (New York: Association Press, 1955), pp. 64, 65.

in churches must consider God's will together and seek to obey His will together in filling their responsibilities in the creation of community.⁴⁴ The Christian faith can inspire that sense of social responsibility, as a response to the moral will of God, which is necessary to a balance between community and freedom. The insistence of the Christian faith that the love of Christ is the final norm of existence must express itself in an unwillingness to stop short of the whole human community in its moral responsibility for the life and welfare of others. With such a faith as its spiritual basis, American democracy would be fortified against the alternatives of an individualism which destroys community or a community compelled by coercion.

⁴⁴Joseph Haroutunian, "The Person in the Community" in *The Church and Social Responsibility*, pp. 47 ff.

A ROMAN CATHOLIC PRESIDENT IN THE AMERICAN SCHEMA

RICHARD C. C. KIM

The election of John F. Kennedy, a Roman Catholic, to the highest political office in the land is a feat hitherto not accomplished by any Roman Catholic aspirant in the history of the American Republic. Not only was the election precedent-shattering, it provided fodder for arguments running the gamut from the danger of youthful immaturity to the horror of religious bigotry. While the argument against youth and inexperience is not to be shrugged off as insignificant, it certainly does not smack of the unpleasant-ries connected with religious bigotry. Bigotry is almost indefin-able, because the term itself tugs at emotional strings which tend to distort the basis for sober judgment. No one wants to be branded a bigot, least of all the bigot. Yet if the definition hinges on the adherence to certain convictions—as it must—the upholders of these convictions are subject to unmerciful and unwarranted attacks. It is exactly on this score that those Protestants who committed themselves against Mr. Kennedy's election on the basis of religious principles were under fire. Applicable against the at-tackers and the victims, is the lamentable truth that "most of America is ignorant of the history of America, and carries along these trivial predispositions which conceal our powerful past with all it has to give us in the present and the future."¹

In defense of those who conscientiously opposed the election of Mr. Kennedy on the basis of religious doctrines, it must be ad-mitted that they were not bigots—not in the popular sense of the term. To be sure, there were those of the fringe elements who, moved by extreme religious radicalism, were engulfed in a hysteria which has yet to subside. This is the same group that opposed previous presidential candidates because they were Unitarians, poor Baptists, or divorcees. But to include with this fringe, those who were genuinely apprehensive about a new "experiment" in American politics, is to commit a gross injustice. They were caught "off guard" by a political change of pace. These people could not immediately accept a condition with which they had not heretofore been afflicted, in many cases even on a local level. Their

¹Chard Powers Smith, *Yankces and God* (New York: Hermitage House, 1954), p. viii.

thought patterns could not be overhauled on such short notice, to envision—without wincing—a Roman Catholic as the head of government in a democratically “Protestant” America. They were still, to some degree, laboring under the illusion that the American political stream was made up of the same elements as were the main currents of the middle ages and the religious tide of some of the present day totalitarian countries. What they could not grasp was the fact that the influences and effects of religious beliefs in authoritarian regimes are vastly different from those in democratic countries. But the Roman Catholics themselves have provided cause for fear because through the ages they have endeavored constantly to interfere in and impose spiritual rule over temporal matters.

A hundred years ago, a Frenchman visiting America made a cursory study of its developments and conditions with prophetic accuracy. The passage of time seems to add to his stature as the most incisive observer of the American stream. Concerning religion, he wrote, “I have seen no country in which Christianity is clothed with fewer forms, figures, and observances than in the United States.” In the same breath, de Tocqueville made it penetratingly clear that “although the Christians of America are divided into a multitude of sects, they all look upon their religion in the same light. This applies to Roman Catholicism as well as other forms of belief.”² And all this was written a century ago by a foreign tourist!

Pointing out further the uniqueness of the American experiment in comparison to other countries, Professor Daniel Boorstin proposes the term “givenness” as the key. “Givenness,” according to its author, “is the belief that values in America are in some way or other automatically defined.”³ It is in this mold the making of America took shape. In other words, in this country there has always been general agreement on basic principles, and although diversity of religious beliefs is permitted by law, it is this same permission that makes for a basic harmony. All this has contributed to a consensus without which problems and issues would be markedly aggravated. The remark that “America seems to be at once the most religious and the most secular of nations,”⁴ means

²Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1904), II, 510.

³Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 9.

⁴Will Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1954), p. 3.

that religious doctrines are not carried over effectively into the realm of politics. Public servants belong to religious bodies of their own choice, mainly because this is a community composed of religious people who enjoy being secular. It was Thomas Jefferson who said, "I do not believe it is for the interest of religion to invite the civil magistrate to direct its exercise, its discipline, or its doctrines,"⁵ and Mr. Kennedy expressed similar views during his campaign. Not unlike Jefferson, Mr. Kennedy is above all a political figure.

In a short but excellent article called "Sects and Cults," Roman Catholicism is loosely identified with Protestantism as belonging in the "mainstream" of the nation's experience.⁶ That is, Catholicism conforms generally to the American practice, while a "third force," which is made up of sects and cults, somehow does not fit into the picture. American Catholicism seems at last to have arrived at "legitimacy."

To overlook the fact that there is a basic doctrinal as well as theological difference between Catholicism and Protestantism is also a delusion. And the Protestant extremists whose sustenance is dependent upon adherence to principles, found themselves in an irreconcilable dilemma during the presidential campaign. Some of them even reverted to the "un-American" practice of staying away from the polls. But the heart of the problem was not in the incompatibility of principles; if it were, under American Protestant principles, it would have been equally difficult to support Mr. Nixon—Mr. Kennedy's opponent—on the basis that he was a Quaker, and thereby subject to the doctrines of pacifism and disarmament. It cannot be denied that religious beliefs affect action, but in America, the adherence to these beliefs is inconsequential in the shaping of policy, or in the administration of law. And this has kept America politically healthy. Although the seat of the presidency is to be occupied by a Roman Catholic for the first time, other important public offices have been held by Catholics without adverse effects in the American mainstream. The United States Supreme Court, the highest agency in the country which has the authority to interpret the Constitution, has not been devoid of Catholicism's "representatives." Currently, one of the justices on the bench is a Roman Catholic. It is interesting to note that

⁵Saul K. Padover, *A Jefferson Profile* (New York: John Day Co., 1956), p. 170.

⁶Martin E. Marty, "Sects and Cults," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XXXII (November, 1960), 125-134.

in the Supreme Court's history there have been six Roman Catholics. Two of them held the position of Chief Justice. And yet, "there has never been the slightest reason to suspect that any one of them was ever influenced in the performance of his judicial duties by ecclesiastical pressures or religious obligations."⁷ Mr. Paul Blanshard, a critic of Roman Catholicism, has also readily admitted that "never in the Supreme Court's long history has the religious affiliation of any justice been shown to have determined his decision in a single case."⁸ Carrying the argument farther, states having Catholic governors have not been so affected as to justify the fears of the "menace" from Rome. Numerous other public officials in the nation are of the Catholic faith. These too have not made America "unsafe" for basic freedoms. "A good tree doth not bring forth evil fruit," and America indeed seems to be a "good" tree.

The principle of religious freedom and the doctrine of separation of church and state are part and parcel of the "givenness" of this great nation, so much so that they are vital parts of America's very essence. It is true that this principle of religious freedom was largely effected by the Protestants, and to them belongs the credit for its initiation and safekeeping. But the America created by this attitude—plus other factors—is a permanent haven for its own creations. The so-called "danger zone"—if it ever existed—has passed, and the American community has levelled off to maturity with built-in stabilizers. It was for posterity that Jefferson wrote, "I am for freedom of religion, and against all maneuvers to bring about a legal ascendancy of one sect over another."⁹ The political freedom identified with America did not just happen. It is largely a concomitant of various environmental, geographical, and institutional factors, not the least of which is the religion "processed" through the decades that only the uniqueness of America could provide. Fortunately—for Americans at least—"possession of religious liberty naturally tends to a demand for political liberty."¹⁰

The American mind has been molded and nurtured by attitudes which reflect a deep sense of belonging, while not being so dedicated to the precepts of the institution to which it belongs.

⁷Eugene Gressman, "The Catholic Issue and the Supreme Court," *U.S. News and World Report*, (October 24, 1960), pp. 66-67.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹Padover, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

¹⁰William Warren Sweet, *The Story of Religion in America* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939), p. 252.

Successful politicians belong to some religious body, but they make very poor "dogma distributors!" Political speeches filled with talk of the "guiding hand of God," or the greatness of this country "under God," once enhanced the chances of the office seeker. Today the opposite seems to be true, or at least the absence of these pious phrases does not inevitably work to the candidate's disadvantage. Coupled with this development is the fact that in the past forty years, church membership has grown more than twice as fast as population.¹¹ Percentage wise, there has been a steady increase in church membership. And all the time Americans are becoming more secular! The churches themselves have gone along with this social phenomenon, which has encouraged the growth of secularism. The huge recreation centers of metropolitan churches and the attractive modernization of buildings and programs—although commendable in many respects—are not conducive to the preservation of traditional sanctity. To a large measure, churches have adopted philistine practices once thought to be outside the religious domain. Mass production, elaborate budgets, and bureaucratic efficiency are not strangers in the sanctuary. Perhaps all this has found fertility because "there never has been in America, and there is not now, that felt distinction between the sacred and the secular which is a commonplace in most religious circles."¹² While mass secularization continues, there is also a disappearance, from the general make-up of America, of the openly anti-religious element. Neither Clarence Darrow nor Robert Ingersoll, who in their day commanded a popular following, would have much of an audience today. An office seeker who denounced God today—oh so slightly—would be committing political suicide. Conversely, if the political aspirant tries to impress the electorate with his personal religious inclinations, no matter how genuine, he is also headed for the public gallows. While office seekers are expected to subscribe to religious sentiments, universal popularity seems to hinge on their belief in God, not in the adherence to religious doctrines. Furthermore, the imposition by an office holder of his own beliefs upon another is also frowned upon. In this country, "religion is restricted . . . in that any exercise of religion injurious to public order or good morals is subject to legal control."¹³ Under these

¹¹*Yearbook of American Churches*, 1920 and 1959; *World Almanac*, 1959.

¹²Willard O. Sperry, *Religion in America* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 146.

¹³John M. Mecklin, *The Story of American Dissent* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1934), p. 348.

conditions, the public official, especially the person who occupies the seat of the presidency, cannot operate beyond prescribed limits, and these limits cannot be changed without changing the whole pattern of the national character. The constitutional checks against arbitrary executive action are becoming less important in the light of the limitations imposed by social relations. This does not mean that society alone can curb the extreme actions of a president. It does mean, however, that leadership in a democratic society cannot function effectively outside its own framework. It is not strange that the "man on horseback" always wears a foreign uniform, never a grey flannel suit.

In his article, "The Presidency and the Roman Catholic Church," Professor Robert Baker expresses very well the prevailing sentiment of many Protestants, to wit, "the support of his [Kennedy's] position by American Roman Catholics in high places has overtones of radical differences between the traditional views of Rome and those of American Romanism."¹⁴ And this is precisely the point; there has always been a difference between the two. For the American Roman Catholics, this difference has never been a cause for alarm, while it has provided the Protestants with unnecessary "jitters." Roman Catholics have never been popular in the American stream, but neither have Jewish businessmen and Negro voters! Unpopularity is hardly a fair criterion for rejection! But the tendency to preserve social stability in this country overshadows the most blatant violation of religious principles. Just as in time of war, many traditional religious practices are overlooked, Americans tend to look upon irreconcilable religious practices as existing in a constant flux. For Americans, social relationships prescribe rules which will not be sacrificed to keep intact sectarian religious dogmas. Dogmas are not that important. There is a strange resiliency between church and state in America through which major crises between the two have always been averted. There is a willingness to keep the two separate while at the same time they support each other. For many reasons there could be no religious wars in America on the European scale, not the least of which is this natural affinity. It is, in the words of one writer, the "folk religion" of America which makes for a certain unity.¹⁵ And it is this unity that looks askance at the one who wears his religious principles on phylacteries.

¹⁴Robert A. Baker, "The Presidency and the Roman Catholic Church," *A Journal of Church and State*, II (November, 1960), 116.

¹⁵Cf. A. Roy Eckardt, *The Surge of Piety in America* (New York: Association Press, 1958).

If all this means the continuance of social and doctrinal schism of the American Catholics from Rome, it is only a natural rift which serves to intensify the typical social experience of this country. The occupancy of high public offices by churchmen has had a tendency to weaken the influence of the church to which the occupants belonged, not to strengthen it. The election of a Roman Catholic as President of the United States has put the Catholics on the defensive. This could prove to be an omen in the gradual waning of Catholic political strength, if the strength ever existed. The apex of Roman Catholic power was reached at the election. This arrival of the Roman Catholics to "legitimacy" is the prime point. With some reservations, a case could be made for Catholic domination, but the man around whom the controversy centers, has himself appointed to most of the important governmental posts, non-Catholics. Of the ten Cabinet officials, only one is a Catholic. If, as has been reported, a great number of Catholics voted for Mr. Kennedy solely on the basis of his religious affiliation, this tendency will also decrease in future elections, until one day it will have no more significance than the Baptists' votes had on Mr. Truman's election. This at least, seems to be a signal part of the American tradition.

America has been kind to Roman Catholics despite conflicts and tensions which have been felt between Catholics and other religious groups. However, religious garb, like military uniforms, are really aberrations in the American scene and find existence either on principle, as in the case of the former, or necessity, as reflected in the latter. It is true that the earliest settlers of this country practiced religious asceticism, and even the "father" of this country wore a soldier's uniform and mounted a white horse. But both were temporary and only served as impressions on the backdrop of the American stage. From this embryo has emerged a unique amalgam: a people who are neither religious nor secular, yet live within the context of both.

Again, de Tocqueville seems to be correct. "America is the most democratic country in the world, and it is at the same time the country in which the Roman Catholic religion makes most progress."¹⁶ But the progress does not add up to church control; instead, it seems to secularize even more traditional religious practices which only enhance the social glamour of the American make-up. Care must be taken in evaluating the American schema, how-

¹⁶De Tocqueville, *op. cit.*, p. 512.

ever; otherwise, in the words of Vernon Parrington, "some of the ablest men the English race has ever bred will be reduced to crabbed theologians involved in tenuous subtleties and disputing endlessly over absurd dogmas."¹⁷ And in America, the principle of an established church—no matter who supports it—is an absurd dogma which cannot become part of the system under existing conditions.

The relation of religion to society in America is "neither that of the 'sect' nor that of the 'church'; it is something new."¹⁸ That is to say, it is new in the sense that "the main stream of religion here has not emphasized repudiation of the principalities and powers of this world or withdrawal from society in order to preserve ethical purity and holiness."¹⁹ Thus Justice William O. Douglas of the United States Supreme Court could say, "We are a religious people,"²⁰ and still stay within the purview and grace of legality. Absolute propositions have been deplored by the American society. If any favor toward absolutist principles has been manifested, it has been in the preservation of First Amendment freedoms. And the heart of the subject at hand is the preservation of one of these freedoms. To the Protestants, but more so to the Catholics, falls the task of making meaningful the retention of this basic freedom through the utilization of the greatest instrument of influence, the free society. Were the makings of a free society absent, there would be a strong likelihood of religious dominance, especially if an hierarchical church system is part of the order. But in America this is not the case. Hence, either the tools of society that make for influence give way, which is not likely to occur in this country, or the religious dogmas must be relegated to ineffectuality. This ineffectuality has long been woven into the American fabric and is fundamentally the guarantee of a free and flexible community, thereby assuring America of continued stability.

¹⁷Vernon Louis Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1930), I, 6.

¹⁸William Lee Miller, "Religion and the American Way of Life," *Religion and the Free Society* (New York: Fund for the Republic, 1958), p. 18.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰*Zorach vs. Clauson*, 343 US 306, 1952.

FROM BARMEN (1934) TO STUTTGART (1945): THE PATH OF THE CONFESSING CHURCH IN GERMANY*

FRANKLIN HAMLIN LITTELL

INTRODUCTION

The study of totalitarianism is attracting increasing attention in university circles, drawing the effort of students and professors in many differing disciplines. In the last two years, to mention one point, several scholars have received foundation grants to study special phases of totalitarian history or practice in Europe. The number of basic books in the field increases steadily. Proposals have been made in several universities for the establishment of research archives and/or institutes to study totalitarianism and, although to date none has reached the precipitation point, it is predictable that one or more will be formalized in the near future.

The reasons why such an area of study is attractive are of great variety, for totalitarianism—by definition, so to speak—affects all aspects of organized society, from art and architecture to zoölogy. The study of it appeals to those united in little else, and in this respect it affords an unparalleled foundation for interdisciplinary effort. At the level of theology, too, the study of totalitarianism affords a worthy basis for dialogue with other disciplines; it is in effect a pathological study of Western Christendom. Just as the medical pathologist can assist us to a better understanding of physical health by a careful analysis of diseased bodies, so the study of totalitarianism can help to an understanding of the factors which make for health in the open society.

The centers of fascism were severely reduced by World War II, although Peronisme in Argentina, Falangisme in Spain, and American nativism in certain organizations, held on for a time. But more important is the threat posed by communism, the most serious encounter since the rise of Islam a thousand years ago and perhaps the most serious since the beginning of the Christian movement. We must not let our revulsion against the style and activity of various adventurers—professional “anti-communists” who in fact imitate the totalitarian tactics of character assassination, guilt by association, insinuation and slander, anonymous letters

*A paper read at the annual session of the Southwest Section of the National Association of Biblical Instructors, meeting at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, Fort Worth, Texas, January 14, 1961.

and handbills, the attempt to polarize the body politic between reaction and revolution, etc.—blind us to the fact that communism is in truth a real threat to the democratic way of life. And the Christian professor, as an officer in the *militia Christi* and a senator in the republic of learning, is under special obligation to see to it that the real nature of the conflict with totalitarianism is so plainly defined that even the anxious and misguided cannot blur the battle-lines.

There are reasons why the struggle of the Confessing Church (*Bekennende Kirche*) with Nazism in Germany, 1934-45, has a special message for Christians who are trying to find their way through the confusions of the American religious situation. This was pointed out by Professor Arthur Cochrane of Dubuque in his presidential address to the American Theological Society last April, reading on "The Theological Significance of the Barmen Declaration, May, 1934":

... the need for a clarification of the old Confessions definitely exists. What is the likelihood of something like Barmen happening in America? One would be foolish to prophesy. There are signs that it may not be too far off, and then there is much that augurs against it. Are we living 'between the times'? Were those twelve terrible and yet blessed years of the Church under Hitler a foreshadowing of the destiny of the Church in other lands in this atomic age? Were they prophetic of a return for us, too, to a pre-Constantinian, New Testament time of the Church? Are we on the threshold of a day when the Church's only weapon and defence will be her Confession of Faith? We do not know. But this much is certain: no Confession of Faith has ever arisen that was not preceded by long, arduous and intense theological activity.

... Meanwhile we are charged with that earnest theological activity without which no Confession is possible.¹

We look forward eagerly to Professor Cochrane's full-length study of the Barmen Declaration and its antecedents, to be published shortly by Westminster Press. And now let us turn to the challenge he gives, and review the story with an eye to learning what it may have to do with us.

¹Arthur C. Cochrane, "The Theological Significance of the Barmen Declaration, May 1934." Mimeographed in *Newsletter* §4: *The History of the German Church Struggle with Nazism* (August 1, 1960), p. 11.

THE BARMEN DECLARATION (May, 1934)

Among the forty-two special studies assigned by the Commission on the History of the Church Struggle in the National Socialist Period, 1933-45—an official commission created by the Evangelical Church of Germany in 1955 and financed by regular monies from the Ministry of the Interior and an occasional grant by an American foundation—two of those already published deal with the background to the Barmen Six Articles. There were, of course, many previous meetings and exchanges of proposals before Barmen; there have been variant drafts subsequently published which caused some dispute among participants. But the source problem is now laid to rest. The two volumes, published by Dr. Gerhard Niemöller—nephew of the famous pastor and son of D. Wilhelm Niemöller, head of the great archive of *BK* materials at Bielefeld—were published by Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Göttingen in 1959:

Die erste Bekenntnissynode der Deutschen Evangelischen Kirche zu Barmen, I: Geschichte, Kritik und Bedeutung der Synode und ihrer Theologischen Erklärung. 269 pp.

Die erste Bekenntnissynode der Deutschen Evangelischen Kirche zu Barmen, II: Text—Dokumente—Berichte. 209 pp.

The statement was drawn up by three theologians; two of them, Karl Barth and Hans Asmusen, are well known in America. After describing the threat to the faith posed by the political capture of much of the church machinery by means of the German Christians (*Deutsche Christen*), some 140 delegates from nineteen territorial churches (Lutheran, Reformed, and United) stated in the form of a classical Confession of Faith the matters at stake in the encounter of the Church with Nazi totalitarianism. Breaking with the harmonistic mind and spirit of the nineteenth century, they stressed the discontinuity between the church and the spirit of the times ("the world" of New Testament parlance). Each article is put forward on the basis of a key text of the Bible, re-stated in terms of the present crisis, and followed by the traditional *damnamus* against heresy.

Article One, based on John 14:6 and John 10:1, 9, reads:

Jesus Christ, as he is testified to us in the Holy Scriptures, is the one Word of God, whom we are to hear, whom we are to trust and obey in life and in death.

We repudiate the false teaching that the church can and must recognize yet other happenings and powers, images and truths as divine revelation alongside this one Word of God, as a source of her preaching.²

The position condemned was that of tribal religion, which saw in the resurgent national spirit and its leader manifestations of Divine providence and revelation. In October of 1933 the German bishops had celebrated the 450th anniversary of Luther's birth with a proclamation which included the phrase, "we German Protestant Christians accept the saving of our nation by our Leader Adolf Hitler as a gift from God's hand." And in January of 1934, shortly after Karl Barth had read his great appeal for resistance, the Lutheran bishops announced, after a conference with Hitler, their unqualified support:

Under the impress of the great hour in which the church leaders of the German Protestant Church were gathered with the Chancellor, they affirm unanimously their unlimited fealty to the Third Reich and its Leader. They sharply condemn all machinations of critique of the State, the Nation and the Movement, which may have the effect of endangering the Third Reich. Especially they condemn the situation when the foreign press is used to portray falsely the debate in the church as a battle against the State. The assembled church leaders [*Kirchenführer*] place themselves openly in support of the National Bishop [*Reichsführer*] and are determined to carry through his measures and instructions in the way he wishes, to hinder the church-political opposition against them, and to strengthen the authority of the National Bishop with all means provided by the church constitution.³

In the light of this, Dietrich Bonhoeffer's bitter words about the orthodox Lutherans take their meaning: "It will yet come to the point when the Beast, before which the worshippers of idols bow down, presents a twisted face of Luther."⁴

²The Barmen Declaration (May, 1934), the Stuttgart Declaration (October, 1945), and The Platform of the German Christians (1932) may be found in translation in my book, *The German Phoenix* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), Appendices B, c and A.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

⁴Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Gesammelte Schriften, I: Okumene . . . 1928-1942* (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1958), p. 47. Edited by Eberhard Bethge; hereafter *DB I*.

The Platform of German Christians (1932) put the matter clearly in Article Ten:

We want an Evangelical Church with roots in the national character, and we repudiate the spirit of a Christian cosmopolitanism. We want to overcome the corrupt developments which have sprung from this spirit—such as pacifism, internationalism, Freemasonry, etc.—through faith in the national mission given us by God.

And again in Article Four we find articulated that position against which the men of Barmen were taking their stand: "We take our stand on the platform of positive Christianity. We assert an affirmative style of Christian faith, as appropriate to the German spirit of Luther and heroic piety." A professor in Berlin, Cajus Fabricius, who was perhaps the preëminent champion of the power of positive thinking in those years, stated the position of hyphenated Christianity, of the homogenization of "the German way of life" and "heroic piety"—"spirituality," as it comes to our ears today!—clearly and unmistakably:

Germany has been raised from out of the depths of the direct need by an overwhelming act of Divine Providence. And in this great happening we look upon the fact that the *Führer*, Adolf Hitler, has been given to us as a very special mark of God's mercy toward us.

We as Germans of German type are at the same time Christians, and as Christians are at the same time Germans of the German type. Hence to us Christianity means no eradication of folk characteristics but rather an experiencing of the Supreme Divine Power behind the outward wrappings that go to make up our racial characteristics.⁵

The threat of reversion to tribal religion was not sudden, nor had it been unnoticed in some quarters. Dietrich Bonhoeffer's friend, Helmut Rösler, had outlined the problem very clearly in a letter under date of February 22, 1931:

The greatest tragedy of the church and of our people I see at the moment *en kairo* is that a purified, glowing national feeling in the powerful movement is tied up with a new heathenism—the exposure and opposition to which is more difficult for psychological reasons than is the case with the

⁵Cajus Fabricius, *Positive Christianity in the Third Reich*. (Dresden: Puschel, 1937), pp. 23, 46, 45.

religion of Free Thought, because it appears in Christian dress. The foundation of this neo-heathen religion is the claim of a demonstrated unity of Religion and Race, more precisely the Aryan (Nordic) race The church is approved only when it serves folk and race. Confessional contradictions are denied for the most part, for the sake of a popular syncretism with the slogan—"all who believe in God, who are of good will. . . ."6

The first article of Barmen was to halt the identification of Christian faith with a national or racial way of life and to assert the exclusive claims of the Word revealed in Christ Jesus, Lord of the world's peoples and of human history.

Article Two, based on I Corinthians 1:30, reads:

Just as Jesus Christ is the pledge of the forgiveness of our sins, just so—and with the same earnestness—is he also God's mighty claim on our whole life; in him we encounter a joyous liberation from the godless claims of this world to a free and thankful service to his creatures.

We repudiate the false teaching that there are areas of our life in which we belong not to Jesus Christ but another lord, areas in which we do not need justification and sanctification through him.

The Confessing Church was severely attacked for "meddling in politics." Because they would not accept the institutional changes made when the state laid violent hands on the church offices, because they refused to accept the Aryan paragraph in the church, because they were determinedly loyal to the ecumenical fellowship, they were attacked by German Christian pamphleteers as "the political church." One of the most widely circulated pamphlets asserting the Aryan origin and contribution of Jesus of Nazareth, along with the German racial genius in spiritual matters, was a tract entitled, *The Political Church and its So-called "Biblical Foundations."*7 It is a revealing point that to this day—in Dallas and Atlanta, Budapest and Kiev (as then in Berlin and Essen)—the world's criticism of the Church comes when the preachers "meddle in politics": Nativism, Nazism, and communism never attack a church as long as it concentrates on personal "spirituality" and purely familial piety.

⁶DB I, 57.

⁷Friedrich Murawski, *Die politische Kirche und ihre biblischen 'Urkunden'* (Berlin: Theodor Fritsch Verlag, n. d.).

The answer of Barmen was to assert the Lordship of Jesus Christ—the “Crown Rights” of the Lord—over all of life; there are no reservations where His claim does not reach. And in putting forward this dimension of the authority of the Lord of the Universal Church they clung with tenacious hands to the fellowship of the ecumenical movement. As early as 1931, the conservative Lutherans Emmanuel Hirsch and Paul Althaus had published a statement opposing German participation in ecumenical conferences.⁸ The martyr Dietrich Bonhoeffer, however, continued to serve as a courier for the Christian fellowship even after *Reichsbischof* Mueller had threatened to bring charges of high treason against any German churchmen who shared information with foreigners on the continuing struggle in the German church.

Article Three, based on Ephesians 4:15-16, reads:

The Christian Church is the community of brethren We repudiate the false teaching that the Church can turn over the form of her message and ordinances at will or according to some dominant ideological and political convictions.

Here again the Aryan paragraph was, among other things, involved. Although the Barmen Articles do not explicitly deal with Anti-Semitism, it was the men of Barmen who protested the Nürnberg Laws (1935) and a tribal church. The German Christians' statements were explicit enough:

7. We see in race, national character and the nation orders of life given and entrusted to us by God, to maintain which is a law of God for us. Therefore racial mixing is to be opposed. On the basis of its experience the German foreign missions have for a long time called to the German nation: 'Keep yourself racially pure,' and told us that faith in Christ doesn't disturb race but rather deepens and sanctifies it.

9. In the mission to the Jews we see a grave danger to our national character. It is the entryway for foreign blood into our national body. It has no traditional justification side by side with foreign missions. We deny the validity of the mission to the Jews in Germany, as long as the Jews have the rights of citizenship and thereby there exists the danger of racial deterioration and bastardization. . . .

The Confessing Church had already faced this issue and adopted

⁸DB I, 18. See also Glenthj, Jorgen, "Dietrich Bonhoeffer und die Ökumene," *Mündige Welt* (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1956), II, pp. 116 ff.

an unequivocal Scriptural stand. In the very first issue of *Theologische Existenz heute*, the main magazine of the resistance, Karl Barth took the position that when a church introduced the Aryan paragraph it ceased to be the Christian Church. There followed, in the practical situation, a lively discussion of whether men could in conscience take a pastorate in a parish which had become an Aryan reservation.⁹ Niemöller and Bonhoeffer released a declaration to the effect that in accepting the Aryan rule the Old Prussian Union Church had separated itself from the Church of Jesus Christ.

Many of the brethren were close to the position that those faithful to the confessions must set up a free church. Bonhoeffer's friend, Franz Hildebrandt (now a professor at Drew), drew up a series of ten propositions stating the case for a free church.¹⁰ Just a month before Barmen, however, the Westphalian Church—where the resistance was strong—seceded from the Union, and this strengthened the case for continued resistance within the territorial churches. Then the Barmen Declaration itself formed the basis for the continuing *BK* claim to be representative of the only true Evangelical Church of the land.¹¹ Articles Five and Six define the proper mutual restraint of church and state if a true *Volkskirche* is to be maintained. This position was re-asserted by Hermann Ehlers in his key address at the Confessing Synod in Augsburg (June 4-6, 1935): "We will not abandon this our Church and become a 'free church'; we are the Church."¹²

The basic work at church law, which determined the status of the *BK* and the "caretaker church governments" until the *EKiD* was established after the war, was done at the Synod of Dahlem (1935). At this second synod of the Confessing Church the claim to legality, to being the true church of the land, was laid; thereafter the question of going the way of the free church receded. The report of Dahlem has been critically edited by D. Wilhelm Niemöller: *Die zweite Bekenntnissynode der deutschen Evangelischen Kirche zu Dahlem* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,

⁹Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Gesammelte Schriften, II: Kirchenkampf und Finkenwalde . . . 1933-1943* (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1959), p. 126. Edited by Eberhard Bethge.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 167-68.

¹¹*DB I*, 201.

¹²Erik Wolf, ed., *Im Reiche dieses König hat man das Recht lieb* (Psalm 99:4) (Tübingen & Stuttgart: Furcht-Verlag, 1946), p. 23.

1958), with 240 pages. But the whole foundation was really fixed in Article Four at Barmen, based on Matthew 26:25-26:

The various offices in the church establish no rule of one over the other but the exercise of the service entrusted and commanded to the whole congregation.

We repudiate the false teaching that the church can and may, apart from this ministry, set up special leaders [*Führer*] equipped with powers to rule.

The kind of leadership which the *BK* sought was the leadership of Christ the Head of the Church. The ministry it cultivated was the ministry of the whole church. It was to be a leadership of service—not like that of the Gentiles, who have lords over them. It was to be a ministry of the whole *laos tou Theou*—the kind which after the war produced the greatest contemporary movements to express “the apostolate of the laity”: the *Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag* and the *Evangelical Academies*. These are the legitimate children of the resistance, more than the new church constitutions which were fixed in the post-war reorganizations.

THE STUTTGART DECLARATION OF GUILT (October, 1945)

The prevailing interpretation has been that the course of the Confessing Church leaders runs from Barmen to Dahlem—from illegality and expulsion to the assertion of the claim to represent the true line of the Evangelical (territorial) Church. The argument of this paper is that the course of the *BK* runs from Barmen to the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt, 1945, and that this symbolizes what happened in Germany—and what it means to the *Ecumene*—better than the restatement of the confessional and juridical foundations of a *Volkskirche* which had salvaged a remnant from apostasy. For the apostasy of the German Christians was but part of the general problem of reversion to culture-religion in the West. And the most important service of redemptive witness which began at Barmen does not begin to be exhausted with the reestablishment of (more or less) purified land-churches in Germany after the war. The most important contribution of Barmen is in pointing the way through repentance to the end of culture-religion, the culture-religion of the nineteenth century.

At Stuttgart there took place one of the most remarkable events in church history. In the presence of God and delegates from

the sister churches, leaders of the Christian resistance identified themselves with the sin of the German people, expressed repentance, and begged forgiveness. The language bears close attention:

The Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany, at its session on October 18-19, 1945 in Stuttgart, welcomes the representatives of the World Council of Churches.

We are all the more thankful for this visit in that we are not only conscious of oneness with our nation in a great community of suffering, but also in a solidarity of guilt. With great pain we say: Unending suffering has been brought by us to many peoples and countries. That which we have often witnessed to our congregations we now proclaim in the name of the whole church: We have in fact fought for long years in the name of Jesus Christ against the spirit which found its terrible expression in National Socialist government by force; but we accuse ourselves that we didn't witness more courageously, pray more faithfully, believe more joyously, love more ardently.

Now a new beginning is to be made in our churches. Founded on the Holy Scripture, with all earnestness directed to the sole Lord of the church, they are going about it to purge themselves of influences foreign to the faith and to put themselves in order. Our hope is in the God of grace and mercy, that He will use our church as his tool and give it authority, to proclaim His Word and to create obedience to His Will among ourselves and in our whole nation.

That in this new beginning we may know ourselves to be warmly tied to the other churches of the ecumenical fellowship fills us with deep rejoicing.

We hope in God that through the joint service of the churches the spirit of violence and revenge, that begins again today to become powerful, may be controlled, and the spirit of peace and love come to command, (the spirit) in which alone tortured humanity can find healing.

So we pray in a time when the whole world needs a new beginning: *Veni creator spiritus!*

(signed)

Stuttgart, 19 October 1945

Bishop Wurm

Pastor Niemöller

Bishop Meiser

Landesoberkirchenrat Lilje

Bishop Dibelius

Superintendent Held

Superintendent Hahn

Pastor Niesel

Pastor Asmusen

Dr. Heinemann¹³

The shrewdly political interpreted this action as another Ger-

¹³In German in Joachim Beckmann, ed., *Kirchliches Jahrbuch: 1945-48* (Gutersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1950), pp. 26-27.

man trick. Astonished newspapermen asked what men who had resisted Nazism for years and experienced jail and concentration camp had to repent of. They answered: "We accuse ourselves that we didn't witness more courageously, pray more faithfully, believe more joyously, love more ardently." They confessed not sins but sin, that *Erbsünde* or "blood guilt" which was theirs as members of the German folk. That act at Stuttgart, which was so unintelligible to the secular mind, drew a line across the pages of history and more than any other single thing opened the way for the spirit of reconciliation which has been at work in Germany and the rest of Europe since the war.

EPILOGUE

As this paper was being prepared, word came from the chairman of the German Commission—Prof. D. Kurt-Dietrich Schmidt of Hamburg—that a Second International Conference on the History of the Church Struggle will be held at Bielefeld, July 25-28, 1961. This comes directly after the Kirchentag in Berlin. American scholars are invited to attend.

The program will include a report on the work of the American Working Party. As a special feature, D. Wilhelm Niemöller will present a display of selected documents in his Bielefeld archive on the church struggle. Other lecturers are listed as follows:

Günther Harder: "Die kirchenleitende Tätigkeit des Bruderrats in Berlin-Brandenburg";

Johann Bielfeldt: "Innere Anfechtung des Bruderrats in Schleswig-Holstein wegen seiner kirchenregimentlichen Funktionen";

Wilhelm Niemöller: "Die Entstehung des Reichskirchenausschusses und des preussischen Landeskirchenausschusses";

Gerhard Niemöller: "Die Abendmahlsgemeinschaft innerhalb der Bekennende Kirche während des Kirchenkampfes";

Dr. Ruppel (invited): "Die Entstehung der Verfassung der Deutschen Evangelischen Kirche."

What do we Americans have to learn from such special studies and from the witness of the Christian resistance to Nazi totalitarianism? The dialogue with our recent past becomes, you see, a

discussion of the terms of our present situation. What does the church struggle have to say to us about our preached word, our churches, our faith? Is it not to point out the bankruptcy of "positive Christianity," of "non-sectarian religion," of "spirituality" without objective norms, of religious individualism which ends in anarchy? Is it not to warn of the perils of culture-religion, of tribal religion? Is it not to lift up again the Person of Him who alone is the center of our history, "the one Word of God"—even Jesus Christ?

CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

PAUL GEREN

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." Article 124 of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics provides: "In order to insure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens."¹

Of these pronouncements on church and state by the two most powerful nations in the contemporary world that of the U.S.S.R. is lengthier and more explicit, both in the use of the phrase "church . . . is separated from the state" and in the guarantee of personal religious liberty. However, the words and their translation are not the issue. What the respective statements mean is to be sought by looking beyond words to the acts, the laws, the customs, the way of life in the United States and the Soviet Union.

We can imagine that the difficulty men experienced in building the Tower of Babel was the confusion of language which made them use different words for the same tool. The worker asked for a trowel and received instead a hammer. Contemporary men in the two most powerful nations agree on the words and can translate English words into Russian equivalents and vice versa. The difficulty in Babel of the twentieth century arises not from the lack of words and translations but from the meanings imputed to the same word on the tongues of differing nations. "Free exercise" from the United States Constitution and "freedom of conscience," "freedom of religious worship," and "freedom of anti-religious propaganda" from the Soviet Constitution are cases in point. "Freedom" is more often pronounced in the Soviet than in the American clauses, but this is not necessarily an area in which nations will be heard for their much speaking. The task of this

¹This is the official Soviet translation as published in English by the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1955. The present language was promulgated as a part of the "Stalin Constitution" in 1936 and is still in effect.

paper is to attempt to discern what is intended by "freedom" and "separation of church and state" when these phrases are employed in the United States and in the Soviet Union.

I

The two pronouncements on church and state arise out of contrasting histories and are divided in time by the century and a half which stretches between the adoption of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1791 and the proclamation of the present language on church and state in the Soviet Constitution in 1936. Initially these contrasting histories must be examined.

The separation of church and state in the United States with its attendant guarantee of religious liberty is a peculiarly American development which began in the colonial period, was enshrined in the Constitution in 1791, and continues to our own generation to be a subject of liveliest interest. There are certain features of the historical development which are salient for the comparison undertaken here.

First, the experience in America, including the colonial era, represents a break with the church establishments of the European variety. Conditions in the colonies did not provide a basis for an established, national church. True, at the time of the American Revolution, nine of the thirteen colonies had established churches, Anglican or Congregational, and three of these persevered beyond their time into the nineteenth century.² As is true of so many comparisons of the New World with the Old, the establishments in colonial America were not so rigid as their counterparts in Europe. The Congregational establishment in Massachusetts and the Anglican establishment in Virginia did not duplicate the established Anglican Church in eighteenth-century England or the established Roman Catholic Church in eighteenth-century Spain. Whereas the pattern in Europe was one established church per nation, in colonial America there were nine different establishments in as many colonies. Each had its peculiarities and special characteristics. The streams which fed the immigration to the colonies were many, and the influences which they carried in religion were plural and diverse. From the first there was a religious pluralism in America.

²James E. Wood, Jr., E. Bruce Thompson, and Robert T. Miller, *Church and State in Scripture, History, and Constitutional Law* (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 1958), p. 86.

Second, the majorities outside the churches of the revolutionary period were probably opposed to establishment. If the majority in the churches favored state churches, "a small but rapidly growing minority of believers early turned the tide against establishment."³ Even in the colonies where there was an established church, a majority of the believers was likely to be formed by a combination of German Pietists, French Huguenots, Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, English Methodists, Baptists, and Quakers.⁴ The overwhelming majority in the colonies were unchurched, ninety-six per cent according to one authority.⁵ They did not want to pay taxes for the support of any church. In this the unbelievers were united with many of the believers.

Third, the cause of separation of church and state in America attracted champions of both the state and the church. Thomas Jefferson was perhaps most concerned for the freedom of the state from church domination but his friends in the Danbury Baptist Association were chiefly concerned for the freedom of believers and the churches. Moreover, the determination of those who worked for religious liberty effected a remarkable unity of diverse theologies and philosophies. Liberal Episcopalians like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison inclined to Deism in theology but made common cause with Baptist, Presbyterian, and Methodist churchmen whose doctrines were orthodox.

Fourth, Americans early identified religious freedom as basic to all personal freedom. The clause on religious freedom in the U.S. Constitution opens the Bill of Rights. The remainder of the First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech, press, peaceful assembly, and petition. This is a sign of the primacy of religious freedom and of its interconnection with all other personal freedoms.

Fifth, though church and state have been organically separate in the United States, freedom and religion have often marched together. They have shared a common spirit and purpose. The state has extended protection to and has sought the well-being of the churches. Members of churches have been loyal citizens, praying for their nation and for those in authority. The United States has not known anticlerical sentiments of the force that disturbed and divided so many European nations. Alexis de

³J. M. Dawson, *America's Way in Church, State, and Society* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), p. v.

⁴Wood *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86.

⁵Leo Pfeffer, *Church, State, and Freedom* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1953), p. 85.

Tocqueville was much impressed by this feature of American life. Whereas he had seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom in antagonism in France, he saw them "intimately united" in America. When he expressed his surprise to various Roman Catholic priests in the United States, "they all attributed the peaceful dominion of religion in their country mainly to the separation of church and state."⁶

II

The history out of which the contemporary Soviet position on church and state evolved is long, complicated, and to most people outside Russia a vast enigma. There are identifiable developments of Russian history which serve as aids to understanding the present. One of these concerns the attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church towards the state. It is an understatement to describe this Church as a state church or an established church. The Russian State and the Russian Church were married from the conversion of the Kievan Princes to Christianity in the tenth century until the revolution of 1917, and this not so much by formal decrees as by the spirit of both partners to the marriage.

Only the indiscriminating lump together the Roman Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox churches relative to their attitudes toward the state. The Roman Catholic Church elaborated the doctrine of the preëminence of spiritual over secular power as in St. Thomas Aquinas' figure of the two swords:

Church and State are as two swords which God has given to Christendom for protection; both of these, however, are given by him to the Pope and the temporal sword by him handed to the rulers of the State.⁷

Whereas the Roman Catholic Church emphasized the preëminence of spiritual over secular power, the Orthodox Church, the Russian in particular, emphasized the harmony, the "symphony" of the two. The secular power had a spiritual mission to perform. This was the secular power's reason for being. The church should be in the state, sanctifying the power by which the state ruled. The two must not be antagonistic or even rivals since each existed as a vessel through which God's work must be done.

The harmony of church and state was manifested through

⁶Quoted in Wood *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁷Quoted in Wood *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

many symbols of Russian history. Tsars, bishops, and the common men regarded the Russian Empire and the Russian Orthodox Church as co-extensive. The Empire was the earthly representation of the heavenly world. The Russian Tsar was the Little Father, the earthly representative of the Heavenly Father, the "living icon of God."⁸ The Orthodox doctrine of the Third Rome is an illustration of the intoxicated extremes to which Russian messianism and apocalypticism could reach. After the fall in 1453 of Constantinople, the Second Rome, the Russian Orthodox proclaimed Moscow the Third Rome. This was the capital of Russia, the God-chosen kingdom. The Orthodox Church alone had preserved the purity of the Christian faith and had become the heir of salvation. There would be no Fourth Rome because Moscow would stand until the end of history, until the Kingdom of God should come on earth.

This concept of the harmony of church and state and of the imputation of sacred purpose to state power was considerably worn with the arrival of the twentieth century but it was firm in the hearts of the Russian Orthodox faithful. The Russian Orthodox Church had known no Reformation or Counter Reformation. Now it was to suffer not a Reformation but a Revolution, not from the devout who professed love of God but from the embittered who preached a dogmatic denial of his existence.

The communist attack on religion and the churches in Russia took its character from the nature and history of the churches there, chiefly the Russian Orthodox Church. True, communism is atheistic; it is against all religion except its own and it deduces atheism logically from dialectical materialism. The trained Communist recites Lenin: "There is nothing in the universe except matter and its motion," and adds, "Ergo, there is no God." This is important for a communist to know but it is philosophical, hardly the stuff of which communist agitation is made among the world's hungry masses. The communist is aware of Plekanov's distinction of the agitator as one who presents only one or a few ideas to a mass of people and the propagandist as one who presents many ideas to one or a few persons. The masses cannot be expected to understand dialectical materialism but through agitation they must be imbued with the proper spirit. The communists philosophize against God; they agitate against churches and priests.

⁸Cf. G. P. Fedetov, *The Russian Religious Mind* (New York: Harper and Brothers, Torchbook edition, 1960), p. 208.

During a trip to the Soviet Union in 1959 I looked through the Museum of Religious History in Leningrad, called the Godless Museum in the more flamboyant days of communist atheism. The museum seemed devoted not so much to proving atheism as to demonstrating that the churches and their priests are the oppressors of the poor. The favorite subjects were reproductions of the torture chambers of the Inquisition, stories in pictures of the oppression of villagers by the village priests, and paintings of the excommunication of Leo Tolstoy and his designation to hell by the Orthodox authorities.

As the Tsar and the Orthodox bishops had taught the harmony of church and state, so the communists leaders have attacked the two and their union. There is a striking parallel between the communist view of the state and of the church. According to the theory of Marxist-Leninism, the state in pre-communist society is an instrument in the hands of the economically ruling class for exploiting the workers.⁹ The destiny of the state under communism is to wither away. The state has not withered away in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev acknowledged at the XXI Communist Party Congress in the U.S.S.R., but this "will take place at the time of complete victory of communism."¹⁰ In communist theory the church is also an instrument in the hands of the economically ruling class for exploiting the workers. Communist manuals contain such paragraphs as the following from Lenin:

Religion is the opium of the people—this dictum of Marx's is the cornerstone of the whole Marxist view on religion. Marxism has always regarded all modern religions and churches and all religious organizations as instruments of bourgeois reaction that serve to defend exploitation and to drug the working class.¹¹

The state will wither away and the church must be destroyed. The state has not yet withered away and the church need not be destroyed today. The tactic is suggested in the title of one of Lenin's books, *Two Steps Forward, One Step Back*.

For the first twenty years after the 1917 Revolution, the Soviet Government manifested open hostility to the churches. All church

⁹Frederick Engel's *Anti-Duhring* develops the argument at greatest length and is much quoted in V. I. Lenin's *State and Revolution*.

¹⁰From speech of N. S. Khrushchev in the radio monitored proceedings of the XXI Communist Party Congress of the U.S.S.R., February, 1959.

¹¹V. I. Lenin, "Attitude of Workers' Party Toward Religion" in *Selected Works*, XI, 664.

property was nationalized immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution and the separation of church and state was decreed in January, 1917. The first of these two decades was marked by crude and violent methods. Churches were closed, the clergy was declared outside the law, scores of priests and bishops were executed, and hundreds were exiled. In the second decade legal procedures were emphasized but with the same goals fixed by Soviet officials.

Under the pressure of war and the need for mobilizing the entire population, Stalin made concessions to the churches in World War II. He permitted the election of a new Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1943. The communists have since that time abandoned the methods of violence against believers in favor of education and persuasion. Communists are reminded that they must avoid giving offense to believers.

The churches have not yet been destroyed in the Soviet Union. A Soviet spokesman estimated their number in 1956 as 20,000 Orthodox, 5,400 Baptist, 1,500 Roman Catholic (including 1,000 Old Believer), 800 Lutheran, 500 Seventh Day Adventist, 500 Jewish, and 100 Armenian.¹² An American observer believes there are fifty million active church members in the U.S.S.R.¹³ Communist authorities often complain of the vigor of religion in the U.S.S.R. *Komsomolskaya Pravda* of August 1, 1958, speaks of "the millions of workers who have not yet broken with religion." In the U.S.S.R. the subject of church and state is alive, but the situation of the churches is precarious.

III

Up to this point we have been concentrating on the American and the Russian historical situations with respect to church and state. Now we shift the comparison to the laws and regulations in each country regarding church and state.

In the United States the federal government, most state governments, and most political leaders carefully cultivate non-interference in theological and ecclesiastical matters. Thomas Jefferson provided a model in his letter to the Danbury Baptists: "Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for

¹²"Notes on Soviet Affairs," Number 186, March 28, 1956.

¹³*The War Against Religion in the U.S.S.R.* (New York: American Committee for Liberation, 1959), p. 20.

his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions. I contemplate with solemn reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and state."¹⁴ Religion is a personal and private matter. Governments have no theological competence. The federal government inscribes "In God We Trust" on certain of the coins but studiously refrains from any exposition of this text. Mr. Justice Douglas elaborated the American concept of free exercise of religion in a 1944 opinion of the Supreme Court as follows:

. . . Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot prove . . . Many take their gospel from the New Testament. But it would hardly be supposed that they could be tried before a jury charged with the duty of determining whether those teachings contained false representations . . . The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied and extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on which all men would agree. They fashioned a charter of government which envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting views. Man's relation to God was made no concern of the state. He was granted the right to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious views.¹⁵

As the citizen is the ultimate authority in matters of belief, so the churches are the ultimate authorities in ecclesiastical matters. In *Watson v. Jones* (1871) the Supreme Court established the principle that a dispute between groups within the same church must be decided by the tribunal created by the church for that purpose. A more recent case, *Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral* (1952), brought the same opinion that controversy within a church must be resolved by the governing body of the church.

In the United States the right to engage in religiously motivated

¹⁴Quoted in J. M. Dawson, *Baptists and the American Republic* (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1956), p. 127.

¹⁵*United States v. Ballard*, 1944.

conduct characteristically prevails over efforts by the state to interfere. The exceptions are of considerable interest because they help to define the rule. Polygamy was clearly a part of the Mormon religion in the last century but Congress made polygamy a criminal offense in the territories. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law on the grounds that to permit polygamy "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."¹⁶ Compulsory vaccination over religious objections has been upheld on the ground that the state has power to protect all persons from dangerous communicable diseases.¹⁷ The national defense also takes precedence over freedom of religious expression. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the World War I draft law¹⁸ and has more recently upheld the right of Congress to draft persons who have religious scruples against military service.¹⁹ There are exemptions for conscientious objectors, but, as M.S. Kempner points out, these "are a matter of legislative grace, not constitutional necessity."²⁰ Thus it is that in the United States the right of free exercise of religion has prevailed over the state's interference except in the narrow area where the moral code of the vast majority of citizens would be shocked, the public welfare endangered, or the national security impaired.

While United States law seeks to protect the right of irreligion as well as of religion, the bias in practice favors the right of religion. This is a point at which the United States presents an exact opposite to the Soviet Union. The rational necessity of freedom for irreligion has been recognized. Mr. Justice Jackson gave as a part of the opinion in the *Zorach* case, 1952: "The day that this country ceases to be free for irreligion it will cease to be free for religion—except for the sect that can win political power."²¹ But Mr. Justice Douglas in the same case expressed the opinion: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being . . . we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the

¹⁶*Reynolds v. United States*, 1878.

¹⁷*Jacobson v. Massachusetts*, 1905.

¹⁸*Arver v. United States*, 1918.

¹⁹*United States v. Macintosh*, 1931.

²⁰William Lee Miller *et al.*, *Religion and the Free Society* (New York: The Fund for the Republic, 1958), p. 84.

²¹*Zorach v. Clauson*, 1952.

effective scope of religious influence. . . ."²² These opinions are not contradictory. In conjunction they say that while we recognize the right of freedom for irreligion, we do so in order to secure the freedom for religion. The courts in the United States make a wider berth for irreligion than society, and the laws accomplish more to secure rights for irreligion than the mores. Such rights as well as the rights of religion are secured by law and not by public opinion polls. The United States Supreme Court is often found protecting the rights of religious and irreligious minorities against the tyranny of the majority.

These principles, that the state shall not interfere in theological and ecclesiastical matters, that religiously motivated conduct shall prevail over state interference except in well defined cases, that the right of irreligion shall be protected as well as the right of religion, and that these rights shall be secured by law rather than popular opinion—these principles set boundaries within which church and state cases are argued in the United States. The field is dynamic. Opinions change, including opinions of the Supreme Court. New circumstances create new questions, among which are: Under what circumstances will religious teaching in public schools be consistent with constitutional principles? Can aid be given to the student in a religious school in such a fashion as to aid him only and not the religious school? Can aid to religious schools on a non-preferential basis be justified? With such questions we in the United States will be wrestling during our days.

IV

Turning now to the situation in the U.S.S.R. we must examine laws, regulations, and policies and their relationship to one another.

The Soviet Law of April 7, 1929, deprived the churches of the right of owning property, teaching religion, exercising charity, organizing parishes, and assuming their former place in public life.²³ Section 17 of this law, which is still in force, provides that churches

may not organize for children, young people and women, special prayer or other meetings, or, generally, meetings, groups, circles or departments for biblical or literary study, sewing, working, or the teaching of religion.²⁴

²²*Ibid.*

²³Vladimir Gsovski, ed., *Church and State Behind the Iron Curtain* (London: Atlantic Press, 1955), pp. xi-xii.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. xvi.

A Decree of 1921 prohibits the teaching of religious doctrine to persons under 18 years of age and a Decree of 1923 prohibits any private religious instruction of children in groups comprising over three.²⁵ The separation of the school from the church as provided in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. means that there may be no schools operated by religious groups except seminaries, and they are allowed only sparingly.

Visits to Baptist churches and people in a dozen communities of the U.S.S.R. in 1959 impressed on me a number of contrasts. Whereas Americans can buy land and build churches wherever they please, subject to zoning regulations and our financial ability, the Russian Baptists may have a church only on the authorization of the Soviet authorities and the allocation of site and building for that purpose. The authorities have thus far allowed only one Baptist place of worship per community, even in Moscow with its population of five million. This situation may be contrasted to that of Dallas, Texas, whose one million people have access to two hundred Baptist churches. The Russian Baptists are confined to the church building for their services and may not have meetings on the streets or in a tent or in the Kremlin. They may have only one type of service, which includes preaching, praying, reading the Bible, and singing, but they may not have a Sunday School or organizational meeting of any kind. No one may become a member of the church before he is eighteen years of age. Printing may be done on behalf of the churches only by the specific allocation of the printing presses which are in the charge of state officials. There is no Russian Baptist seminary for the training of preachers for more than 5,000 churches. Like all other churches, Baptist churches may not maintain libraries or reading rooms or offer any form of medical or charitable aid.

These letters of the Soviet laws and regulations are severe but the spirit of the laws is even more sinister. The Government of the U.S.S.R. cultivates an air of neutrality with regard to religion in the knowledge that the real assault is assigned to the Communist Party. The *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, after observing that the church exists legally in the U.S.S.R., points out that "the Communist Party, however, considers religion as an ideology having nothing in common with science and therefore it cannot remain neutral The Party considers it necessary to conduct

²⁵*Ibid.*

profound, systematic scientific-atheistic propaganda."²⁶ The Program and Constitution of the Communist International, Moscow, 1936, states: "Among the tasks of the cultural revolution . . . a special place is occupied by the struggle against the opiate of the people, religion—a struggle which must be carried on systematically and relentlessly."²⁷

The assignment of the battle against religion to the Communist Party is no accident. A special relationship obtains between the Party and the Soviet Government. The Party is the sovereign power. For every geographic or functional government agency in the U.S.S.R. there is a corresponding body of the Party; for a state factory a Party cell, for a municipal government a municipal Party organization, and so forth throughout all agencies. The Party organization supplies the nominations for the one-candidate elections. The leader in the Soviet Union is such by virtue of his position in the Party and not by virtue of the governmental office he may hold. N. S. Khrushchev, for example, did not become Chairman of the Council of Ministers until January, 1958, but his predominance was assured from late 1953 when he was named First Secretary of the Party, the top position in the Party and therefore in the U.S.S.R. Communist theory anticipates the withering away of the state. The Party, as Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution declares, is "the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to build communist society and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state." The destruction of religion is assigned to the prior power, the Party, which is not expected to wither away.

Another feature of the communist war against religion is its involvement with and reliance on education. We have already noted that the attack on churches and priests as exploiters and charlatans is the primary weapon for agitation among the masses. The primary instrument for propaganda is education and its chief note is that religion is unscientific. The communist vocabulary seeks to establish "science" as the antonym of "religion." "Every religion contradicts science," declared *Pravda*, June 28, 1948. Professor Togerow, an eminent Soviet scientist, has written in the *Red Star*: "The relics of religious faith must be wiped out by systematic scientific propaganda." The Soviet agencies against

²⁶*Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, L, 642-643, quoted on p. 3 of "The War Against Religion in the U.S.S.R.," cited in note 13.

²⁷Program and Constitution of the Communist International, Moscow, 1936, quoted on page 2 of "The War Against Religion in the U.S.S.R."

religion are no longer called atheistic societies but societies for the promotion of scientific knowledge. When interest in religion increases in the U.S.S.R., as has been officially recognized within recent years, this is explained as the failure of the societies for the promotion of scientific knowledge to do their work effectively.

The opposition of science and religion is presented at a primitive level in the Soviet Union. A Soviet writer, commenting on a news item about the use in Harvard of electronic machines to compare ancient biblical texts, expresses the judgment that it is illegitimate to use science for religious purposes because the two are incompatible.²⁸ During a 1959 visit to the Museum of Religious History in Leningrad, I noted a replica of Sputnik I and inquired of the guide what was its relevance to religious history. He replied that Sputnik I had been "up there" where the believers said God was, and he wasn't there. The University of Moscow, thirty-odd stories high, the tallest building in Europe, housed in 1959 only the mathematical and scientific studies, not the humanities and social studies which were accommodated elsewhere in the city. A Russian guide said to me: "Do you know what was the tallest structure in Moscow during the Tsars' regime? The Bell Tower of Ivan the Terrible which called the Tsars to prayer. Quite a change. They gave the highest place to superstition. We give the highest place to science."

Soviet education, to which the cause of indoctrination against religion is entrusted, has its own special character. It is education for and by communism, as explained in this paragraph from a high Soviet authority:

. . . the entire system of public education in the U.S.S.R. ensures the communist education of the youth, the education of a new, people's intelligentsia, the education of millions of active builders and defenders of communist society.²⁹

In Tsarist Russia, one-half of the schools were church-connected. In separating the church from the school, the Soviet Constitution forbids not only the church school which teaches the general curriculum but the church religious school as well, even the Sunday school. (The seventeen Russian Orthodox seminaries exist for the training of adult priests and are church operated.) Even the appearance of a church school is to be avoided. *Molodezh Estonii*,

²⁸Quoted in *The War Against Religion in the U.S.S.R.*, p. 10.

²⁹E. N. Medinsky, *Public Education in the U.S.S.R.* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), p. 6.

June 8, 1960, publishes the following question and answer. "Question: May religious organizations form orchestras, choirs, and other artistic circles; plan concerts, excursion parties and youth groups; conduct work among children, teen-agers and women?—Answer: All of these activities of religious societies and of the clergy are unlawful." *Sovetskaya Estoniya* of August 27, 1959, relates that the Baptist preacher Osvald Talts tried to form a brass band in Pukaskaya Secondary School but he was foiled when the school children recognized that the band was "merely a trick to give them religious instruction."

Decrees and laws concerning education in the Soviet Union originate as policies determined by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. As a consequence the relationship of religion and science is not a question to be hammered out on the anvil of discussion between teachers and students. The matter has been settled by the Party's dictum that science and religion are irreconcilable. From the kindergarten through the graduate schools this will be the indoctrination for students.

The next point in the effort to discern the spirit of the Soviet laws regarding religion is an examination of the apparent equal treatment of religion and anti-religion implied in the sentence from the Soviet Constitution: "Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens." The official explanations make it clear that there is no actual equality of these freedoms. For example:

It is known that on the basis of Article 124 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution, all citizens of our country are free to perform religious ceremonies and to conduct anti-religious propaganda. But the law does not give anyone the right to conduct religious propaganda.³⁰

The first Soviet Constitution permitted "freedom of religious and anti-religious propaganda" but this was altered in 1929 to read "freedom of religious confession and anti-religious propaganda" and in 1936 to the text used in this paper, which is still in force. The freedom extended to believers by the present Soviet Constitution is that of worship; the freedom extended to atheists is that of propaganda.

The same inequality obtains in regard to "freedom of conscience," which is explained as follows in an official journal:

³⁰*Sovetskaya Estoniya*, March 10, 1960.

Freedom of conscience for parents who are believers must not be turned into a denial of the freedom of the public and the state to intervene positively in questions of family training. . . . It is necessary to raise the question of the lawful defense of the persons of children from religious intoxication and violence. . . . Our public and our legal organs must enter into the defense of children subjected to spiritual and moral mutilation on the part of parents; they must enter into the defense of the freedom of conscience of the rising generation. . . . The truly revolutionary humanism of Soviet legislation and the lofty principles of Communist morality demand this.³¹

Freedom of his own conscience belongs to the citizen defined as a person eighteen years of age or older. The conscience of his child belongs not to the parent but to the state so far as the child's indoctrination is concerned.

Another observation on the spirit of Soviet law will conclude this series. It is a remark on the strangeness of the concept of Soviet law to us who are familiar with the Anglo-American concept. Several historic American documents provide the basis for our inference that God is the "author of liberty." The Declaration of Independence affirms that men have the gifts of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness from their Creator. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not grant citizens the right of free exercise of religion but forbids Congress to take away that right. President Kennedy said in his January 20, 1961, inaugural address: "And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebearers fought are still at issue around the globe—the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from the hands of God."

Dogmatic atheism rules out any transcendent reference point for communist law or morality. From the perspective of a religious man this leaves the communists infinitely poorer for the loss of wonder, gratitude, and praise, but the communists consider that atheism accords them an area to be taken over from God. They can ask from Party members the ultimate loyalty which Christians consider belongs to God alone. They can deal with men as if there were no God. They can give or withhold freedoms as if communists were the authors of liberty. Whatever conveniences and small favors the churches may be accorded in the Soviet Union are enjoyed as a matter of policy and not as a mat-

³¹E. Filimonov in *Melodoy Kommunist*, Number 10, October 1959.

ter of law. They are tentative-present but not necessarily future. The distinctions between private and public law which are of such consequence in the Anglo-American concept are rejected. Soviet law becomes in effect the policy of the Soviet Government.

V

The summation of this comparative study is formulated as the answer to the question: What is the object of the separation of church and state in the respective countries?

In the United States this object is the continuation and prosperity of both church and state. All through American history and into the present epoch the cause of separation of church and state has drawn champions from the church as well as from the state. These champions differ in emphasis but they have been willing to make common cause with one another. Neither has been a nihilist with respect to the institution of the other. American churchmen are not likely to be anarchists, or American statesmen militant atheists. Roger Williams' phrase "a free church in a free society" emphasizes that it is freedom which provides the common ground for those who aspire on behalf of the state, those who aspire on behalf of the church, and those who wish to serve both.

As between religion and irreligion, the American people have leaned toward religion. Justice Douglas' words in *Zorach v. Clauson* (1952) have already been quoted: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." In spite of this predilection for religion, the American concept of separation of church and state maintains an even legal balance between the rights of religion and those of irreligion. In the *Everson* case, the Supreme Court defined the meaning of the establishment clause in the U.S. Constitution with a strict equality of rights for religion and irreligion: "Neither [a state or the Federal Government] can force or influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance."³² It is a part of the genius of American life and institutions that our people can hold basic religious presuppositions while our legal system can maintain an even balance of rights between religion and irreligion.

³²*Everson v. Board of Education*, 1948.

The separation of church and state in the U.S.S.R. was promulgated by the communists with the purpose of bringing about the death of religion. As in so many other things, Lenin's thought and counsel were decisive:

We demand that religion should be held a private affair as far as the state is concerned. But by no means can we consider religion a private affair as far as our Party is concerned. . . . We demand complete disestablishment of the church so as to be able to combat the religious fog with purely ideological and solely ideological weapons, by means of our press and by word of mouth.³³

Lenin was a fanatical exponent of irreligion. To him religion was a fog which scientific education would dissipate. The separation of church and state was in his mind a means of getting the process started.

From the following paragraph in the publication of the Central Institute for Antireligious Correspondence Courses, printed by a Soviet Government printing office in 1932, it is plain to see that the Soviet Government understood well the following thought from Lenin:

It is necessary to emphasize that the Soviet Decree concerning the Separation of Church from State and the School from the Church, was from the beginning directed against religion. . . . Therefore, it would be treason to the dictatorship of the proletariat, treason to the spirit and sense of the Decree on Separation of the State from the Church to fail to organize the fight against religion on a union-wide [national] scale by the force and the means of the government itself. . . . In a few words the analysis of the Decree may be summarized as follows: If the capitalistic separation of Church and State leads to the free and highest development of religion, the Soviet separation of Church and State leads to the free and final death of religion.³⁴

More recent statements on the separation of church and state do not emphasize the "final death" of religion and none of the statements fixes a time for it. The lack of an announced date characterizes many goals of Soviet communism. The state will

³³V. I. Lenin, *Socialism and Religion* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955) p. 9. This booklet is an English translation of excerpts from Vol. 10 of Lenin's *Works*, 4th Russian edition.

³⁴Quoted in Gsovski, *op. cit.*, pp. xi-xii.

wither away, but not necessarily in our time. Communism will come replacing the present order in the U.S.S.R., which is called socialism, but no specific date is assigned. Rewards will eventually be according to need, replacing the present rule of "to each according to his productivity," but this obviously cannot happen now. Similarly religion will die, but before it does there may be increases in its influence from time to time, as Soviet authorities have recently acknowledged. Since the communists have ruled out heaven by definition, they apparently find themselves in need of a principle of the future by which present shortcomings can be forgiven and hope extended.

In the meantime, what may be expected in the application of the Soviet version of the separation of church and state? The personality of the Soviet leader is a factor. Whereas Lenin was a hard atheist, Khrushchev is an easy-going one. He supplied clergymen to encourage weddings in the eastern lands newly brought under cultivation and, as quoted in the official Soviet report of his speeches during his 1959 visit to the United States, made seventeen references to God, Christianity, and the Bible.³⁵ These expressions include "God be with you," "Carry on and God bless you," "... you and we are also in a way brothers in Christ." In his May, 1960, interview in Paris, while most of the world listened and looked, Khrushchev said, "God is my witness." He explains such statements as "a way of speaking" and we know him to be a man aware of his audiences, including their religious beliefs. Even when all these discounts have been made for Khrushchev's religious vocabulary, he emerges as one with less than full enthusiasm for the work of the societies for the promotion of scientific knowledge. So far as we can see from the outside, Khrushchev is not determined that religion must die in the U.S.S.R in his day. The orthodox position of communism on religion has not been given up, but it seems to have suffered some erosion.

³⁵*Khrushchev in America* (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1960).

BOOK REVIEWS

Faith and Understanding in America. By Gustave Weigel, S. J.
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959. 170 pp. \$3.75.

The story is told of Charles Lamb (whether true or not, I do not know) that once when walking down the streets of London with a friend, he remarked: "Do you see that man over there? I hate him." The startled friend naturally inquired who the unfortunate man was. Whereupon Lamb replied, "I don't know. That's why I hate him." This simple story tells us a great deal, it seems to me, about the nature of love, the nature of man, and the nature of God who had to become Man that men might love Him. It also, I believe, tells us something about the problems which arise between men of differing colors, creeds, and cultures.

Gustave Weigel, Professor of Ecclesiology at Woodstock College in Maryland, endeavors in this book to make some small openings in the wall of ignorance so that a modest amount of understanding might seep through. For the communication barrier which exists between the Catholic and the non-Catholic, the author is willing to place the greater share of responsibility on the Catholic.

The Catholic has no right to expect the majority of his secular community to speak and understand his distinctive language. Such an expectation is either naïveté or arrogance. If I join a community where a tongue other than my own is the medium of intercourse, I simply must learn the language of the place to the best of my ability. Anything less is wrong. The Catholics of our land have not reflected on this truth sufficiently. That non-Catholics do not know more of the Catholic idiom is regrettable, but that the Catholics do not know the language of their non-Catholic milieu is tragic (p. 65).

But if it takes two to make an argument, it takes two to reach an agreement or understanding. There are, therefore, obligations on the non-Catholic side of the barrier as well.

The book's nine chapters present in a most straightforward manner the questions raised and the problems posed by the presence of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States of America. In so brief a compass, a great deal of simplification is demanded. When and if this becomes oversimplification is a ques-

tion the reader—Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or secular—will often find himself raising. How hard it is, for example, to say anything very accurate or meaningful about “the Protestant” view of the Church. On the major issue, however, of the authority of the scripture and tradition versus the authority of scripture alone, the lines seem to be clearly drawn. To Protestants who have outgrown the “proof-text” method for creating their own theology, the author suggests that this method is just as invalid in interpreting papal encyclicals as it is in interpreting Pauline epistles.

Much of Professor Weigel's concern is with the secular society in which Catholicism, no less than Protestantism and Judaism, finds itself immersed and enmeshed. In the face of the inadequate faiths of naturalism and nationalism, what is required is the recognition that the “way to save our society is to go beyond society in search of the Kingdom of God and its righteousness, and then all the other things will be added unto us.” The role of Roman Catholicism in bringing this about is examined with refreshing candor. The Church's authoritarianism and antimodernism are acknowledged and described. Regarding that tangled web of church and state, the author writes: “The Catholic must insist that he does not put the body politic above his religious community. The non-Catholic believer really makes the same profession but since he is in the majority, he does not have to insist upon it.” And even though in America the Roman Catholic is such by “exercised choice” rather than by inertia or default, there is a lamentable gap between his private action and his Church's teaching. Many Catholics, “though quite strict in matters of domestic morality . . . will in professional life be unscrupulous and sophistic in their evasions of public morality.” But if stone-throwing is confined to those churches which need not make such a confession, Father Weigel can move into a glass house.

In short, the author of this little volume does not evade, he does not temporize. He seeks to clarify and explicate but not to apologize. In summarizing the teaching of his Church on one point, he concludes: “There he [the Roman Catholic] stands; he cannot do otherwise.” In thus picking up beautifully the heroic words of Martin Luther, he reminds us that fidelity to the deepest convictions of one's soul is an admirable thing, whenever and wherever found. And we who stand on the other side of that

barrier which blocks fruitful dialogue might remind ourselves of other noble words: "Always be prepared to make a defense to any one who calls you to account for the hope that is in you, yet do it with gentleness and reverence" (1 Peter 3:15).

Edwin S. Gaustad

Religion and American Democracy. By Roy F. Nichols. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959. vii+108 pp. \$2.50.

The material of this little volume was presented originally in a series of lectures at the William Marsh Rice University. The author is a well-known American historian who has been a member of the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania for many years.

Beginning with a brief summary of the Protestant Reformation with special reference to England and the Puritans, Professor Nichols discusses in general terms the religious influences surrounding the founding and early history of the English American colonies. His emphasis is on the democratic principles that evolved in the development of the religious life of the colonies. The first chapter of the book is entitled "The Democracy of American Religion." It is refreshing to read a work which devotes more space to each of the colonies of Connecticut, New Haven, New Jersey, and Virginia than to Rhode Island. The author emphasizes the fact that "religious impulses were effective in certain colonies planted by those of the Anglican persuasion. For that Church also was moved by missionary zeal."

Professor Nichols devotes eight pages of the brief volume to the story of Roman Catholic activities in the Spanish colonial empire in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, and California. He points out that the Spanish in North America pursued a policy similar to that of the Spanish crusade against the Moors by establishing garrisons and missions to keep order and to sustain the faith. Dean Nichols believes that the community life of the Spanish colonies "had a base as religious as that of the English colonies" with at least "an embryo sense of self-government."

Two religious developments of the eighteenth century, the

Great Awakening with its emphasis on individualism and equality and the evolution of rationalism and deism with reliance on natural laws, "vigorously influenced the course of American democracy." Religion was undoubtedly a factor in the movement for separation from England and an influence guiding the founders of the new nation.

The second and last chapter of this scholarly work is entitled "The Religion of American Democracy." Professor Nichols may be appropriately called the Frederick Jackson Turner of American religion. He asserts that religion "was destined to . . . mold the institutional forms of American democracy" and "so to infuse the polity with its spirit that in time democracy was to resemble a religion." The religious revivals of the first half of the nineteenth century produced a "crashing democracy of salvation," an "Arminian Revolution" with an equality that could not be denied by any decree or law.

Much of the last chapter is devoted to the presentation of evidence of the close, though voluntary, relation between religion and the state. Numerous quotations are given from the publications of the American Tract Society, school books such as Peter Parley's *Common School History* and Lindley Murray's *English Reader*, and from the proclamations of Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis during the American Civil War showing the influence of religious thought on American society.

Religion and democracy continued their association through the eras of big business, the muckrakers, the New Deal, and the two World Wars. Basic religious concepts, according to Dean Nichols, have never been eliminated from the American way of life despite the separation of church and state. The author warns the reader, however, that "neither religion nor government should ever be taken for granted." The American people must be dedicated to the maintenance of American democracy. The salvation of our way of life, Dean Nichols believes, may well depend on our belief in our capacity "for self-government under divine guidance."

J. D. Bragg

Roman Catholicism and the American Way of Life. Edited by Thomas T. McAvoy, C.S.C. Fort Wayne, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1960. 248 pp. \$4.50.

Most of the eighteen essays included in this study of American Catholicism and the American Way of Life were originally prepared for two symposia held at the University of Notre Dame under the auspices of the Department of History and the Faculty Seminar in American Civilization. As a whole, the collection makes rewarding reading. The first group of essays deals largely with the general position of Roman Catholics in the United States, while the second group concentrates on how various Catholic immigrant groups have adapted to American society. Edited by Thomas T. McAvoy, Chairman of the History Department at Notre Dame, the papers are uneven in quality. Some of them are excellent and informative; others are poorly organized and repetitious and really tell us little that we did not already know about the subject; and some are merely curious.

One of the best is the initial essay by Will Herberg on "Religion and Culture in Present-Day America." True, Dr. Herberg mainly restates the now familiar and extremely influential Triple Melting Pot thesis which he first put forward in *Protestant-Catholic-Jew* (1955); but his restatement has added depth and utilizes fresh illustrations from more recent times. The extent to which his analysis has permeated thinking about the religious situation in the United States today is attested by the number of times his thesis is referred to, directly or indirectly, by other contributors to the volume. Winthrop S. Hudson's "Protestantism in Post-Protestant America" is thoughtful, and Father Francis X. Curran's "The Religious Revival and Organized Religion" contains an illuminating discussion of what is called the contemporary revival of religion in the United States. Among the more informative essays are those dealing with Catholic immigration to the United States since World War II, Catholic scholars in secular universities, the American Negro and the Catholic Church, the attitude of native American Catholics toward Catholic immigrants (it was frequently hostile), and those describing the adjustment of different nationality groups to the American scene: Latin-American, Italian, Polish, German, and Irish Catholics. A concluding historiographical essay by Vincent De Santis is critical of the treatment of the Catholic immigrant in American history by both secular scholars and Catholic filiopietists and insists upon the

"absolute necessity of scientific and objective studies about Catholic immigrants by trained Catholic historians themselves."

For non-Catholics, Raymond F. Cour's examination of "Catholics and Church-State Relations in America" and R. L. Bruckberger's discussion of "The American Catholics as a Minority" will be of special interest. Father Cour insists that American church-state relations are

characterized by an atmosphere of mutual respect and friendly co-operation by people of all faiths. Although the text of the Constitution and laws is religiously neutral, the spirit of our political institutions and the practice of our governments reveal an attitude of positive friendliness to religion on a non-sectarian basis. All creeds benefit by this arrangement and through it make their individual contributions to civil society.

This is surely a fair summary of the American system of "friendly separation" between church and state. When it comes to specifics, however, Father Cour retreats into vagueness. "Questions of bus transportation for school children," he declares,

school lunch programs, free non-religious textbooks for sectarian schools, and even state or federal aid to religious institutions—these will be settled not through any reference to the theology or religious affiliation of the potential beneficiaries but through the response of the people to civic needs of their communities. In the solution of these and other civic problems with religious implications, the persons and groups involved will be treated as members of the American state rather than as members of any American church.

One can't help wondering what Father Cour thinks of the aid-to-education program presently being sponsored by the Kennedy administration. Does he share President Kennedy's absolutely correct view of church-state separation? Or does he support the condemnation of the Kennedy program recently made by leaders of the American Catholic hierarchy on the ground that it discriminates against parochial school children? No clear-cut position on this vital question emerges from his discussion.

There is nothing vague about Father Bruckberger's essay. It is just about the only essay in the book which is openly partisan (or shall we say proselyting?). To non-Catholics, it will seem by turns curious, irritating, and amusing. Father Bruckberger laments

the fact that so few American Catholics "seem to entertain the idea that they might possibly convert the nation as a whole." After all, he reminds his co-religionists, Catholics have "an advantage of superior wisdom" and they "know what to think and in matters of action they know better than the others [i.e., non-Catholics] what is good and what is bad—or at least they should know." He does, however, "beg American Catholics never to desire any privileges" even if they should one day become the majority in the United States. And, writing before the 1960 election, he adds:

. . . I consider it very childish for American Catholics to complain of never having a Catholic President. They are fortunate. A President, even if he is a Catholic, is only a man. He is exposed to many errors and arouses many hostilities. If he were a Catholic, people would not fail to say that all his errors come from the fact that he is a Catholic. What a great blessing it is that American Catholics have never had to exercise political power. After all they can not be reproached with having signed the Yalta Pact or of having dropped the atomic bomb on open cities.

Presumably Father Bruckberger does not mean to suggest a causal relationship between American Protestantism and Yalta and Hiroshima; still, in the remainder of his essay he blames "Puritanism" (which he defines, following Saint-Just, as "either virtue or a reign of terror") for most of the nation's and the world's ills, including Communism, McCarthyism, and segregation. "The whole world," he concludes,

with the possible exception of South America, is now dominated by Puritanism and this is a terrible danger. Even Communism is essentially Puritan . . . it has an idea of virtue peculiar to itself, and intends to impose it by a reign of terror.

No doubt both Roger Williams and Karl Marx will be turning in their graves at this point; and their spiritual descendants—whatever else their vast differences—will undoubtedly unite in questioning the "superior wisdom" of an analysis as superficial and simplistic as this one.

Paul F. Boller, Jr.

The Powers That Be. By Clinton D. Morrison. (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 29.) Naperville, Ill.: Allenson, 1960. 144 pp. \$2.25.

One of the major problems which has confronted New Testament scholarship since the time of Dibelius is the significance of the spirit world in the thought and writings of Paul. The subtitle of this monograph, "Earthly Rulers and Demonic Powers in Romans 13:1-7," indicates that the present volume will place us in the very center of the controversy which continues to rage. The author, Professor of New Testament in McCormick Theological Seminary, has made a significant contribution to the wider problem of Paul and the spirit world while providing us with new insights into the New Testament view of the relationship between church and state. His contribution is the more welcome because it is set against the background of a deep appreciation and understanding of Pauline theology in general.

The specific problem to which this book addresses itself is the question of the meaning of Paul's words in Romans 13, the most direct statement in the New Testament regarding the Christian and the state, when seen against the continued conflict between the early church and the state. How could Paul be so positive when he had suffered so severely at the hands of Roman officials?

The book is divided into two parts. Part one presents a brief, but brilliant, summary of recent interpretations of the passage and an evaluation of these contributions in light of the remaining unresolved differences of interpretation. This summary takes the form of a presentation of the positive contribution of a "new solution" (since 1936) and the negative reaction to it. The new position, based on the wider study of the spirit world in Paul, insists that the "authorities" referred to in Romans 13 are spiritual (demonic) powers who accomplish their work through earthly rulers, much like the folk angels in late Judaism. These authorities, now conquered by Christ, made it possible for the state "to provide an environment conducive to the proclamation of the Christian message and its being heard" because the angelic powers behind the state are always ultimately subjected to Christ. Thus Christian subjection is a recognition of the state's role in God's plan of redemption. Linguistic, historical, exegetical, and theological arguments are marshalled for this solution and the negative reaction to it.

Part two, an exegetical contribution to the interpretation of

the passage, reminds us that we must understand the passage as a "communication." That is to say, we must seek to understand both what Paul "imparts" and what he leaves unsaid because it was self-evident to Christians who were part of the Graeco-Roman world. A careful study of these presuppositions of communication leads to the following positive conclusions: (1) It is absolutely necessary that we recognize a common first century view of the state based on a world view in which "the ruler was both divine by appointment and human by birth, and the boundaries between spirit world and the world of humanity and nature were fluid and often imperceptible." In the world view of Paul's day a strong and significant relationship between civil rulers and spiritual powers was everywhere accepted. (2) Christ's victory over these spiritual powers must be understood in terms of the Christian's faith and not in terms of the enslavement of the powers. The state and the powers subjected to Christ from the moment of creation exist to make it possible for the church to carry out her mission, but the state does not itself participate in the redemptive activity. Christian subjection to the authorities is therefore based on a new and conscious relationship to governing officials which grows out of the response in faith and the consequent new existence as a man in Christ. Although not spelled out in detail, this view demands a re-evaluation of the relationship of church and state in terms which recognize the full nature of the church under the Lordship of Christ. Faith and life in Christ alone can be the basis for humble obedience or patient suffering when God must be obeyed rather than man.

This well and carefully documented book should be read by every person who is seriously interested in understanding the Biblical message regarding church and state. Although, strictly speaking, it is a monograph in technical New Testament scholarship, it is written with such clarity that the non-specialist will have little difficulty in following its argument.

Heber F. Peacock

Religion, Politics, and the Higher Learning. By Norman White.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959.
\$3.50.

The title of this collection of essays is misleading. It suggests

that the book deals with the relations to each other of such important human activities as religion, politics, and the higher learning. Actually, the main theme of these essays is the contemporary nature of philosophy and its relevance to moral and social problems.

It is Professor White's contention that while recent philosophy has rightfully repudiated "the pretentious method of those who claim to conduct us to the Truth by way of labyrinthine metaphysical systems, aided by the flimsiest threads" (p. 1) and has become analytical and critical, it has "virtually abandoned all of the more humane philosophical disciplines" (p. 2). The thesis he supports is that this turning away from humane interests is not entailed by the analytical interpretation of philosophical function and method. Recognizing that philosophy has become highly technical and that its primary function is the analysis of language, he makes two pleas. In his own words, "The first [plea] is for greater analytic interest in social and political ideas, in the description and understanding of culture and politics. . . . My second plea is more controversial because it calls for a greater concern with normative ethics than is fashionable among analytic thinkers today" (p. 9). Of the first plea, he says, "This will not involve a fundamental change in the method of analytical philosophy: it will merely add to its subject matter" (p. 9). In various places throughout the essays he illustrates this statement by showing that as the philosopher analyzes the language of science, so he can bring his analytic tools to bear on the language of the practical men who are faced with understanding and solving the great social problems of our time.

Obviously, however, the second plea is the more important one. White says of it, "Here I am not merely asking for an extension of the method of analysis to a neglected subject matter but rather for a realization of the fact that the line between the analytic and the synthetic is so blurred as to make it virtually impossible for an analyst of ethical notions to avoid being seriously concerned with the substantive questions of personal and social ethics" (p. 9). In addition to linguistic analysis, the philosopher has a genuine responsibility to examine and to clarify the practical social issues themselves. It is not enough to analyze the language used by the social scientist or the man on the street when talking about these issues or even to formulate a language in which to talk about them more philosophically. It is necessary for the

philosopher to get at their substantive heart as well as their linguistic appendages. Of course, the philosopher should approach the social issues with the calmness and the techniques of analysis, using all their advantages, but he must not stop there. White says of a philosopher who fulfills this task, "His interests fall between those of the speculative philosopher and those of the technician" (p. 11).

The argument of the first essay is based on two facts of our contemporary intellectual scene: first, the loss of prestige which has accompanied the philosopher's emphasis on linguistic analysis, and second, the need for someone to perform in our day the kind of social criticism which philosophers once performed. Admitting that much has been gained by the elimination of speculative philosophy and by the development of linguistic analysis as the primary methodology of philosophical inquiry, White insists that the narrowing of philosophy to such technical activity, whether directed at scientific or ordinary language, is responsible for this loss of prestige. To regain it, philosophers should use linguistic analysis as a key to open the door to the more significant and substantive criticism of present day ethical, social, political, and religious issues. He makes much of the fact that the great precursors of analysis were social philosophers.

He argues that analytical philosophers are peculiarly suited by their objectivity and their critical techniques to deal with these issues, which cannot be dealt with adequately by "moralists" or social scientists.

The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth essays describe English and American philosophy at the midcentury. Their theme is that the attempt to restrict philosophy to the analysis of scientific or of ordinary language is an unwarranted limitation. The last five essays are attempts to exemplify the kind of philosophical activity White has been demanding. Their brevity makes them little more than suggestive. In the sixth essay, he describes certain American interpretations of history and then presents his own view that history is "narrative." Philosophy of history should take as its task the clarification of the "logic of narration"; this can only be done with "the tools of linguistic philosophy." In the seventh essay, he discusses Isaiah Berlin's work, *Historical Inevitability*, which he feels illustrates an analytical philosophy of history but with which he disagrees at certain points, especially that "the language of praise and blame" entails moral freedom.

The book gets its title from the eighth essay, "Religion, Politics, and the Higher Learning." White suggests that the serious religious thinkers of today are not concerned with the existence of God, but with the moral question, "Should I be religious?" In discussing the meaning of "religious," he makes two points: first, that to be religious is to have a particular faith, Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish; and second, that religion involves all levels of human activity, including the cognitive. At this latter point, White takes issue with those analysts who would accept "the compromise view of religion as a purely emotive, or aesthetic, or social affair." Thus the question of the nature and existence of God inevitably intrudes itself and must be faced by the philosopher of religion. The most interesting part of the essay deals with the implications of his view of religion for higher education. The chief implication is that courses in religion in non-religious educational institutions should be courses *on* rather than *in* religion. It rests on the view that higher education is "understanding and the communication of that understanding to our students" (p. 97). It cannot be the propagation of a particular religious way. The author does not give any clues concerning how this can be done without creating the usual problems of emphasis and interpretation which divide religious groups.

The ninth essay deals with "religious commitment and higher education." Here the author proposes a divinity school in a secular university in which the professors would not be committed to a specific set of beliefs about God, but to an interest in theological questions. White believes that this is in line with the commitment demanded of every professor in every department of the university. "Such a commitment would imply no more than a serious, intellectually honest, dedicated concern with the problems of whatever subject he studies" (p. 109).

The last essay is a study of various approaches to human nature, including those of John Dewey and Reinhold Niebuhr. In this essay, White goes beyond the methods of linguistic philosophy to criticize certain basic views of man. It is a plea for what he calls "ethics without essences" and "principles without dictators," that is, social philosophy, which being free from both philosophical and personal authorities, is the result of careful and critical analysis.

These essays are provocative, but far from conclusive. They raise interesting problems of philosophical method which they do

not solve, especially the problem of accepting linguistic analysis as the heart of philosophizing while insisting that philosophy must transcend linguistic analysis. Perhaps this is the crucial issue in philosophy today.

Leonard A. Duce

God and Caesar: A Christian Approach to Social Ethics. Edited by Warren A. Quanbeck. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1959. 207 pp. \$3.95.

Here is a brilliant, lucid exposition of classical Lutheran views on the problem of the state and the Christian faith. Most if not all of the contributors are Lutherans and reflect both an accurate understanding of Luther along with an understandable prejudice against other forms of Protestantism particularly as they regard the state. The book is much more than an apology for Lutheran viewpoints concerning the state, however. It is the result of several years study and conference on the part of the authors. On the one hand, these writers show objective critical insight into Lutheran, as well as other, approaches. On the other hand, they not only reiterate many of the central ideas common to those who are called Protestants, but defend them well in the process. Furthermore, the authors have examined many themes and approaches and have produced in these essays a very thoughtful basis for reflection on the modern crisis of the state.

The authors include Walter E. Bauer, Paul M. Bretscher, George W. Forell, Jaroslav J. Pelikan, Arthur C. Piepkorn, Otto A. Piper, and Ernest G. Schwiebert. Some significant emphases in the book are worth special attention.

Otto Piper makes a clear distinction between Lutheran and Calvinistic approaches to the state and sets forth an essentially Lutheran concept of church and state. Although at times Professor Piper does not seem to be sufficiently aware of differences between Luther and Lutheranism, he indicates finally that the views of Luther and Lutheranism need to be synthesized.

At times the authors tend to overplay the place of nationalism in other reform movements and underestimate the place of love for country in Luther's reform work. Even so, they emphasize the

dangers of nationalism to Christianity in a most forceful way. They are correct in warning against the identification of Christianity with a particular government, and in urging the church to be on guard against allowing nationalism to become a religion which replaces the church. They also enumerate specific suggestions as to what the church can do.

In addition, these men point out that democracy and totalitarianism are often presented as oversimplified alternatives. Actually, they argue, both democracy and totalitarianism possess concepts which are harmonious to and inconsistent with the Christian view of man. Following the interests of the group in the dangers of nationalism, Walter Bauer discusses the philosophy of the American Revolution, and concludes that the philosophy of revolt was in effect a rebellion against an old authority. Some of the ideas presented were rooted in a religious perspective, but in Bauer's opinion it was a secular perspective which came to dominate the Revolution.

Finally, these Lutheran thinkers show that Luther was not as conservative on ethical questions as some writers have made him appear. And they, like Luther at his best, show real sensitivity and insight into the proper relationship between faith and social ethics. Similar application of theological insights to social ethics needs to be made by representatives of other theological positions.

E. Earl Joiner

Community, State, and Church. By Karl Barth, with an introduction by Will Herberg. New York: Doubleday, 1960. 189 pp. \$.95 paper.

The reader acquainted with the thought of Karl Barth will find no surprises in this collection from Barth's works during the years 1935-1946. Indeed, only Barth's controversial essay on "Gospel and Law," which appears in translation for the first time for the general public, has not had wide circulation in the English speaking world. The second document, "Church and State," appeared originally in 1938 as *Rechtfertigung und Recht*. The last of the writings, "The Christian Community and the Civil Community," appeared in German as *Christengemeinde und Bürger-*

gemeinde in 1946, and was included in the volume by Karl Barth, *Against the Stream: Shorter Post-War Writings, 1946-52*, edited by Ronald Gregor Smith (Philosophical Library, 1954). In spite of this duplication, Dr. Herberg's intention to provide the main outlines of Barth's views on *Community, State, and Church* as they found expression in the eventful years of the German Church struggle with National Socialism is to be commended. Not only do these essays shed light on a crucial period of contemporary church history which has received all too little attention from both secular and church historians in our country, but "they still have a most significant word to say to us in the midst of our present perplexities and problems" (p. 9).

One of the best features of this book is the excellent introduction by Professor Herberg to the social and political philosophy of Karl Barth. The divisions of his introduction are: I. Barth's Basic Theological Orientation; II. Barth's Teaching about Society, State, and Church; III. Barth's Encounter with National-Socialism; IV. Barth's Encounter with Communism; V. Conclusion.

On the positive side, the reviewer would list the following contributions of this introduction. First, Herberg recognizes the close connection between theology and ethics in Barth's thought, and he attempts to place Barth's social and political views within the total context of his theology and the situation in Nazi Germany and the post-war world. Although Barth's leadership in the Confessional Church struggle against the German Christians and National Socialism had led many to criticize his neutralism in the East-West struggle, Herberg makes clear that the too facile criticism concerning a lack of social and political concern in Barth and his followers is wide of the mark. Second, Herberg helps to provide an orientation for understanding the movement of Barth's thought from the period of dialectical to the later Christocentric theology. Third, Mr. Herberg illuminates the manner in which Barth's changing political insights are always made in the light of his understanding of the Word of God and the situation in which he stands. Fourth, the author summarizes adequately Barth's role in the German Church struggle and provides valuable bibliographical references to documents not included within this collection. Fifth, Herberg enables the reader to see the background of Barth's present position with regard to Communism, thereby bringing the discussion of Barth's political ethic up to date. The basic question which he puts to Barth is whether his

radical stand in opposition to the National Socialist perversion of the state does not require a less equivocal stand with regard to Communism. Following the analysis by Charles West in *Communism and the Theologians*, Herberg suggests that this may be due to Barth's somewhat naive and poorly informed view of contemporary Communism. Other critics see Barth's refusal to side with either West or East as evidence of the recurrence of an underlying lack of social and political concern. A more serious charge stems from Barth's intention to develop a Christocentric doctrine of the state. Accordingly, he sees the state as an analog of the church. As such, it is already within the sphere of redemption and is intended ultimately to serve the end of man's redemption. Pursuing the viewpoint of Charles West, Herberg questions whether Barth's doctrine of the "triumph of grace" in all realms of life does not lead him eventually to oversimplify the role of the state within human power structures and to avoid the necessary task of serious analysis of the political arena and relative political decisions (p. 66). However, since Barth has always held that the church does not respond to a given ethical or political problem on the basis of a legal code or "on principle," one may hope that his position is not so fixed that he may not yet say another word.

Barth's essay on "Gospel and Law" is deserving of special mention. In his characteristic manner, Barth has reversed the traditional Lutheran order which speaks of "Law and Gospel." "The Gospel is not the Law, just as the Law is not Gospel; but because the Law is in the Gospel, from the Gospel, and points to the Gospel, we must first of all know about the Gospel in order to know about the law, and not *visa versa*" (p. 72). For Barth, therefore, law and gospel are not intended to be dialectically opposed as in Lutheranism; rather the promise of the covenant (Gal. 3:17) precedes the giving of the law, and the law is "hidden and enclosed in the ark of the covenant" (p. 71). The unity of the two are seen in that both are the "one Word of God" which is always a word of grace. This Word of God may take the form of judgment (law) or of life (gospel), but in all of its diversity it remains a word of grace in that it always points to the divine approach of God to man. For Barth the knowledge of both the unity and diversity which exist between law and gospel is knowable finally only in Jesus Christ, who is the "content of the Gospel." Here is one of the earliest evidences of the Christocentric approach to

understanding the Christian faith so crucial in the *Church Dogmatics*. Barth writes: "Thus, we can certainly make the general and comprehensive statement that the Law is nothing else than the necessary *form of the Gospel*, whose content is grace" (p. 80). Hence the law is always "claim and demand" in the concrete situation in which the gospel is heard. "From what God does *for* us, we infer what he wants *with* us and *from* us" (p. 78). Thus understood, the law does not have the all too human form of "you ought or must," but rather is heard as the divine "you may or shall be."

From this perspective Barth sees man's sin as his continued attempt to separate and oppose law and gospel, thereby making out of the former the means for his justification before God. Among the manifestations of this distortion, Barth points to the attempt on the part of the Nazis and some German Christians to elevate the "Volksnomoi" (people's laws) to quasi divine status (p. 91).

The date of the Confessional Synod at Barmen (p. 9) should be 1934 instead of 1935 as indicated. On page 39 it is cited correctly. This reviewer wishes that Professor Herberg had indicated those sections in the *Church Dogmatics* which would serve to lend perspective to some of the ethical and political positions which were set forth in these occasional writings.

In sum, this book offers an excellent introduction to both the theology and social and political philosophy of Karl Barth. Whether one's response is positive or negative toward Barth's conclusions, one must deal with his thought if one is to understand either the contemporary state or the church.

David L. Mueller

Human Rights and World Order. By Moses Moskowitz. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1958. 239 pp. \$3.95.

The *Journal* offers no apology for offering its readers a review of so "old" a book. It is certainly one of the few competent expositions of the operation of the machinery within the framework of which a few dedicated individuals are now attempting to devise remedies for the perennial problem of man's inhumanity to man.

Except for four years in the United States army in World War II, the author has been working in public and private international welfare agencies since he finished his training in history and international law at Columbia University in 1937. Since 1947 he has been a consultant to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

After a brief first chapter in which he summarizes precedents of the last four hundred years for international interest in human rights, Moskowitz describes the United Nations machinery for dealing with these problems and then considers racial discrimination in South Africa and forced labor in the Sovietized countries, the only two cases which have actually come before the United Nations. He thinks that, aside from the stark fact of poverty, the failure of the United Nations to solve these problems stems from the fact that it "is a political body in which decisions are made not on the merits of a case, but on the basis of political expediency and prevailing political sentiment." Political expediency calls for honoring national sovereignty above all else. In 1953, political expediency led the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to declare that "the United States was opposed to international efforts to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms by compulsion"; he also suggested that education "was more appropriate to the United Nations as a means of carrying out its Charter obligations in the field of human rights." In implementing this view, the United States refused to "become a party to the covenants on human rights."

Moskowitz would like to defend the dignity of man against attacks from either church or state; he would like to substitute the individual man for the state as the primary interest of politics. This reviewer would suggest that, if we are going to keep on honoring states which deny human dignity to their people, we should at least give the oppressed millions an occasional vote of thanks for enduring injustice as quietly as they do.

To find any fault at all with this book is a bit like arraying oneself against righteousness. Yet, it does seem that the exalted nature of the subject matter deserves better quality in bookmaking and in the style of its presentation. But shoddy materials and poor proofreading may really be eloquent evidence that those of us who are free and comfortable do not really care much about the problems of the less fortunate. And probably Moskowitz and others who engage in the tedious conversations and negotiations by which alone we can make progress in eliminating injustice are

driven to adopt a professional jargon. It does seem, however, that "finalize" is barbaric enough without "concretizing."

There is a useful Foreword by Rene Cassin, former Chairman of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The thirty pages of footnotes and documentation are supplemented by four appendices which give the text of the pertinent United Nations agreements. There is also an adequate index.

Ralph L. Lynn

Josephus Daniels in Mexico. By E. David Cronon. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1960. xiii+369 pp. \$6.00.

Shortly after taking office in March, 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Josephus Daniels as Ambassador to Mexico. That Daniels should receive a high post in the new administration came as no surprise because the North Carolina editor had been active in Democratic party affairs for forty years and had been counted among the President's close friends since the Wilson era when Daniels, then Secretary of the Navy, had selected Roosevelt as his Assistant Secretary. However, many were surprised to learn that Daniels was to go to Mexico. After all, in 1914 Secretary of the Navy Daniels had ordered American marines to seize the port of Veracruz in an effort to prevent the German freighter *Ypiranga* from delivering munitions to the forces of General Victoriano Huerta, the Mexican dictator. Eventually the Huerta regime was overthrown and U.S. military forces were withdrawn from Veracruz, but both pro-Huerta and anti-Huerta groups strongly resented the American encroachment. Nevertheless, during his eight years as Ambassador, Daniels demonstrated a capacity for winning the friendship and respect of Mexicans of all classes as he sought to implement President Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy"; but his work did not gain the approval of all his fellow countrymen.

Chapter IV, appropriately titled "A Nearly Fatal Speech," will be read with special interest by students of church-state relations.

In this chapter, most of which was originally published as "American Catholics and Mexican Anticlericalism" in *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLV (September, 1958), Professor Cronon describes how Daniels' remarks on the subject of public education in July, 1934, provoked a storm of protest by American Catholics who charged that the Ambassador had endorsed the anticlerical policies of the Mexican revolutionary regime. Led by the Jesuit weekly *America*, agitation for Daniels' removal soon developed into a determined campaign to force the Roosevelt administration to bring pressure to bear on the Mexican government with the objective of obtaining greater freedom for the Catholic church in Mexico. Criticism of Daniels and the administration's Mexican policy by Catholic editors, politicians, lay organization leaders, and members of the hierarchy prompted a flood of letters and petitions addressed to the State Department. When Roosevelt came to the support of his ambassador and made it clear that he was not disposed to intervene in Mexico's church-state conflict, he also became the target of Catholic attacks. Cronon quotes Archbishop Michael J. Curley's declaration that "Twenty million American Catholics are getting pretty tired of the indifference shown by the Administration"; and he quotes the following threat voiced by U. S. Representative Clare G. Fenerty of Pennsylvania: "If, as a statesman, he [Roosevelt] will not think of human rights, let him, as a politician, think of the next election." The President's landslide victory at the polls in 1936 showed that few Catholics allowed the Mexican issue to affect their voting; however, Cronon points out that Democratic party leaders had been so concerned about such a possibility that Daniels was told that he could serve his party best by refraining from active campaigning on behalf of Roosevelt. Thus he remained in Mexico instead of returning to the United States for the speaking tour that he had originally planned.

In spite of the abuse heaped upon him by American Catholics, Daniels was genuinely interested in promoting religious liberty in Mexico, and Cronon states that his efforts on behalf of Mexican Catholics did contribute to the improvement of church-state relations in that country. However, he also emphasizes that another important factor involved was President Lazaro Cardenas' desire to concentrate on land reform and the promotion of labor union activity. These programs raised new problems for Ambassador Daniels since many American land owners were deprived of their

Mexican holdings and a labor-management dispute in the petroleum industry resulted in the nationalization of American owned oil companies in that country. A large portion of this book deals with the land and oil problems.

Drawing upon an impressive amount of source material found in the State Department files, the Daniels Papers in the Library of Congress, and the Roosevelt Papers in the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, Professor Cronon has written a sympathetic account of Daniels' diplomatic service that throws considerable light on U.S.-Mexican relations from 1933 to 1941 and tells us much about the septuagenarian ambassador whose passion it was to make the "Good Neighbor Policy" a reality in Mexico. This book is a "must" for students of American diplomacy and modern Mexican history. It will also be of value to those who would learn more of Catholic pressure group tactics and political activity in the United States.

Lyle C. Brown

Civil Liberty in South Africa. By Edgar H. Brookes and J. B. Macauley. Cape Town: Oxford Press, 1958. 175 pp. \$3.40.

Even the superficially informed person who relies on the headlines in the American newspaper as his sole source of printed information must have concluded in the early months of 1960 that all is not well in the Union of South Africa. Our headline-reader might further have concluded that this has been the case only in recent months and that only the "natives" have been disadvantaged by what has occurred. The latter two conclusions are false. Dr. Brookes and Mr. Macauley convincingly demonstrate this in their book. Dr. Brookes is a political scientist who represented the Africans of Natal in the Union Senate for fifteen years. Mr. Macauley has been a Queen's Counsel at Natal. Their study of civil liberties in South Africa was initiated by the South African Institute of Race Relations. Their approach is a legal one. Although they include pertinent legal and political events of earlier periods, the period on which they concentrate is the decade, 1947-1957. Their study might be described as the systematic unfolding of the legal, constitutional, and philosophical background of the currently grim status of civil liberty in South Africa.

The authors stress a number of times that their book is not a polemical one. Insofar as their book is a recording of the content of statutes, the announcement of judicial opinions, and the promulgation and application of administrative regulations it is not polemical. Such a recording of legal data is organized into separate chapters on: freedom of movement, freedom of expression, economic freedom, educational freedom, religious freedom, social freedom, and the franchise in South Africa. These chapters are preceded by one on the police force (Chap. III) from which it would seem that the parliament and the judiciary have abdicated to administrative supremacy, that the concept of *ultra vires* has been abandoned, that protection from unreasonable search and seizure has disappeared. In other words, "The new concept of the police function tends to clothe the police force with the character of the political police of authoritarian rule." It is important to note that this development interferes with the liberty of all racial groups in the Union—not just the "natives." Chapter four deals with the question of whether racial discrimination is fundamental in South African law. The authors conclude that it is. American readers should note that this contrasts with the U.S. concept of legal equality. Segregation in the U.S. was legally permissible for nearly six decades provided it adhered to the formula of "separate but equal." Segregation in South Africa need not consider equality.

These "non-polemical" chapters account for all but the two beginning chapters. The first two chapters lay the valuational framework from which the authors judge the factual data in the remainder of the book and from which the reader is presumably expected to do likewise. Tragic though it may be, these chapters are definitely polemical in high intellectual circles today. The authors begin with natural law and natural right philosophy and move to the position that the rule of law is indispensable to the protection of man's inalienable rights. In philosophy, first the logical-positionists and now the analysts have undercut natural right philosophy. In all the social sciences, the behaviorists would deny that rights are natural. Dr. Brookes and Mr. Macaulay seem implicitly to bow to the behaviorists' point of cultural relativity by stressing that the rule of law was never firmly rooted among the Afrikaners anyway.

This book is a useful one for its factual account of the activities of the South African regime. What a pity that the dif-

ference between the regime and much of the world is not a disagreement over what the regime has done but over how to evaluate what it has done!

H. Dicken Cherry

Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace. By Roland H. Bainton. New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960. 299 pp. \$4.75.

In this valuable volume Dr. Roland Bainton, Titus Street Professor of Ecclesiastical History at the Yale Divinity School, presents a penetrating analysis of Christian attitudes toward war and peace. He documents with utmost care the positions of Christian thinkers and Christian groups toward participation in war and then states with remarkable clarity and candor his own view of the relevance of Christian ethics to the problem of international tension and his understanding of the ways to peace.

After thirty years of reflection upon issues confronting the Christian conscience in war and peace, Dr. Bainton sets forth a critical evaluation of pacifism, the just war, and the crusade. These attitudes toward war and peace are discoverable in antiquity and have had a prominent place in Christian thinking.

The early Christians had an intense aversion to killing human beings, and they were convinced that war was incompatible with the more excellent way of life revealed in Jesus Christ. "From the end of the New Testament period to the decade A.D. 170-80 there is no evidence whatever of Christians in the army" (pp. 67-68).

Apparently the first effort to accommodate the Christian ethic to military service was made by Ambrose, who emphasized the concept of "the just war." This theory of the just war was amplified by Augustine, who concluded that a war is justifiable if its intention is to restore peace and to vindicate justice, if it is waged under the authority of a responsible ruler, if its motive is love of neighbor, if its conduct is in harmony with the demands of justice, and if it is carried on in a mournful mood. This theory has been dominant in the main stream of Christian history, but Christian thinkers are finding it increasingly difficult to define justice and to sustain the judgment that a particular war is just

in its origin, its motivation, its objective, and its conduct.

The theory of war as a crusade in the interest of high values and sanctioned by religion was revived during the First World War; and after the war which some interpreters described as a holy war "to make the world safe for democracy" came the crusade for an enduring peace. An impressive number of churches and ministers in the United States declared that they would never bless any war in the future, but prior to the Second World War pacifism collapsed and the theory of a just war was revived.

After describing the emergence and delineating the history of the three major attitudes toward war and peace in Christian ethical theory, Dr. Bainton subjects them to critical appraisal. He draws attention to the relation of technology to modern warfare and to the inadequacies of the theory of the just war in view of the impasse to which powerful nations have come through strategic bombing, obliteration bombing, and the threat of annihilation by a nuclear war. He distinguishes carefully between a secularist pacifism and a Christian pacifism and articulates the values of the latter position. He records a passionate plea for a Christian exploration of ways to peace and asks, "Why should not a historian be profoundly concerned over behavior which threatens to bring an end to history?"

Olin T. Binkley

Human Freedom and Social Order: An Essay in Christian Philosophy. By John Wild. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1959. xi+250 pp. \$5.00.

About this book and its author several things should be said at the outset. The title seems to this reviewer to be misleading. Much of the content of the book was given at Duke University as a part of a research program in the important area of Christianity and politics established by funds from the Lilly Foundation. The auspices under which the lectures were given evidently colored the formulation of the title. The book moves in the "no-man's land" between philosophy and theology. Dr. Wild, who has recently left Harvard to go to Northwestern University, has had an unusual philosophical pilgrimage. Earlier in this career he advocated

Aristotelian realism (cf. *An Introduction to Realistic Philosophy*, 1948). In recent years he has been greatly influenced by existentialism (cf. *The Challenge of Existentialism*, 1955). Just before giving these lectures Dr. Wild returned from a sabbatic year in Europe where he made a special study of phenomenology. In regard to his personal religious convictions he is known as an active Episcopal layman. This statement of background will help the reader to understand that the point of view of the book is based on what Wild calls the phenomenological method. This method insists that the world in which we live is not the objective world of nature and science. Our world is the "Lebenswelt"—the human world of concrete experience—which is prior to all other worlds. Dr. Wild combines this phenomenological perspective with existential urgency and a fairly orthodox Christian conviction.

In a historical section Wild seeks to demonstrate that in Western thought the objective and rational on the whole have triumphed and personal freedom has declined. This is peculiarly evident in the modern scientific period. The scientific era has been accompanied by the present-day nation-state which uses mass media and organized mass welfare. The individual person is outwardly caught in this organized existence like a fly but inwardly he lives in a strange, irrational world. This situation has brought us to the end of an era.

We cannot return to the mythical way of life. The answer advocated by Wild is found in the Christian guiding image. This image was rationally interpreted and objectified for many centuries. The true biblical image was recovered by such men as Kierkegaard, Buber, and Bultmann. The Bible, properly understood, does not deal with the world of objective reason but is concerned with the concrete world of the *Lebenswelt*.

Dr. Wild next outlines the objections to the idea of a distinctly "Christian philosophy" under a "Christian guiding image" and seeks to answer the objections.

With the Christian "guiding image" and the "Lebenswelt" or "life-world" theme in his mind, Wild attempts to illuminate man's ethical relations with special emphasis on the political world.

Politics has usually followed the ethics of self-realization, which are public, rational, legal, universal, and abstract. Most traditional philosophies such as Thomism, Naturalism, Positivism, Scientism, and Marxism all agree in adopting an objective point of view and in subordinating the individual to the group. In contrast, the

Christian way emphasizes the person, becoming, giving, and sacrifice.

The gap between the objective life of the group and the free human person must be bridged. The aim of society must not be confined to establishing the abstract *possibility* of personal freedom in a negative way. The actual *practice* of personal freedom is to be the goal of every human institution. Our formalized, rationalistic system of education is also at fault. The contributions of art, literature, and music must be appreciated. *Basic personality* is to be the fundamental concern.

If we wish to call it ethics, it is an ethics of love, forgiveness, and sacrifice. Society must set up support of the exercises of human freedom. Institutional structures must be loosened up and opened up. Of every public policy one should ask: Does it prepare for, or thwart, the disciplined exercise of personal freedom?

Wild affirms that the sovereign nation-state should be distrusted and its vast powers diluted. Local loyalties could be retained in a broad framework. Necessary welfare functions could be administered by federations. Creative hobbies and education for leisure hours must be extended. The life-world subjects should be emphasized.

This suggested approach arose from Christian sources. While retaining its unity with the Christian witness of the ages, the Christian must be open-minded and exercise sacrificial freedom if the Christian influence is to count in the contemporary world.

This book is quite important. The reviewer had the privilege of working through this material with Dr. Wild in a seminar at Harvard before it was published. It sounds some notes that need to be sounded just now in the area of philosophy. This approach has been utilized by Rollo May and others in the area of psychology.

Most Christian readers will be in sympathy with many of its emphases. Naturalism needed to be reminded that measured space, time, and "objectively" observed events are not all there is to history. The Christian self-giving ethics are important. Orthodox Christian "rationalists" and "objectivists" could well heed some of Wild's emphases.

Difficulties can be noted. The book stands under some of the same criticism which could be brought against the "subjectivism" and "irrationality" of Kierkegaard and Bultmann. The Christian image itself is not made clear. There are semantic difficulties.

Loose and sweeping statements are made. Perhaps such faults are almost unavoidable in a book which breaks such fresh ground. And yet once again it should be affirmed that this is a "germinal" book which should be widely read.

John P. Newport

The German Phoenix. By Franklin Hamlin Littell. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960. xv+226 pp. \$3.95.

Professor Littell in six closely knit and well written chapters tells the story of the German Protestant churches, their failures and victories, and their phoenix-like rise from the ruin and ashes of total defeat of the Third Reich in 1945. The first three chapters furnish the historical background of the German churches as they grappled with life and death issues under Adolf Hitler. Chapter 1, "From Barmen to Stuttgart," encompasses the German church struggle against the Nazification of the Christian witness after the fateful year of 1933 when Hitler came to power. At Barmen, in May of 1934, the newly formed Confessing Church, led by men like Karl Barth and others, threw the gauntlet at the Nazi Christians, who were then formally in control of the recently united German *Reichskirche*, and in a six-point confession challenged the new Islam that was engulfing the churches of Germany. Littell is eminently right in saying that the silent resistance against Hitler and his regime by the Confessing Church (*Bekennende Kirche*) has hardly been told in America and, what is really tragic, is that its deepest insights and challenge have hardly been heard in our American churches.

When Pietists, including Baptists and Methodists as well as men of learning and power, all too easily fell for the allurements of the Nazi myth of "blood and soil," the men in the Confessing Church declared through one of its spokesmen, Hermann Sasse: "The Evangelical Church has to start every discussion with the avowal that its doctrine is a permanent affront to the morality and ethical feeling of the German race." During the years of Hitler's twelve-year reign of terror thousands of Lutheran and Reformed pastors went to jail for their evangelical convictions, while others were exiled or executed. In view of the sufferings of the people of the Confessing Church of Germany it was doubly significant that

these very defenders of the integrity of the Christian gospel should dramatically confess in the now famous Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt of October 19, 1945, their own deep involvement in the disaster and horror that Nazism had brought upon the world. Were these fellow-Christians who had spiritually resisted Hitler and his ilk, and who had defied the demonism of deluded German Christians, really guilty of all that had happened in Germany from 1933 to 1945? Littell rightly answers:

They were guilty in the same sense that every white American is guilty when the murderers of Mack Charles Parker go free in Biloxi, Mississippi. They were guilty, and they knew that they were guilty, in a dimension which is foolishness to the unbelieving and incredible to those who have not faced the terrible possibility of a righteous god (pp. 23-24).

Chapters 2 to 5 further unfold the antecedents of the German Church situation and the emergence of new and vital forces within the religious life of the German people. Although there were men like Wichern who in the middle of the last century warned the German churches against the rise of militant godlessness and communism, German church life was compromised by other-worldly Pietism, by stodgy orthodoxism with its reactionary defense of "throne and altar," and by an often brilliant but also powerless liberalism. It took the rise and threat of Hitlerism to open the eyes of German churchmen to the dangerous cracks and fissures in their religious life. After 1945 two factors, the German Church Rallies (*Kirchentage*) and the Evangelical Academies, have become instruments of renewal for man's total religious, social, and political existence.

The German churches have recaptured a vision of the church's involvement in all of human life. In the Evangelical Academies and the great Church Rallies in Leipzig, Hamburg, Berlin, Frankfurt, and Munich, laymen of all walks of life have once again been drawn into the dialogue with Christian pastors and theologians and with the Lord of history. This does not mean that German economic prosperity has not also brought about a new indifference among many people. The German churches, however, are again seriously pondering, in ultimate seriousness, the Christian's stake in the crucial issues which the gospel of Jesus Christ and his Lordship of necessity raise for the Christian conscience.

Several appendices, including the Barmen Declaration, the

Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt, a questionnaire on Evangelical Academies, and a list of these Academies in all of western Europe considerably enhance the value of this book.

A few minor spelling mistakes on pages 54, 92, 98, and 101 will no doubt be corrected in the next edition.

We commend this "tract for the times" to all seminarians, college students, Christian laymen, and pastors who with John Woolman pray to "be baptized afresh into every condition and circumstance of men," owing ultimate allegiance only to the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

William A. Mueller

The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1958. By Ivar Spector. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959. xii+328 pp. \$5.00.

In this work, *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1958*, Professor Spector has presented to the student of history, or to anyone desirous of an intelligent understanding of the unfolding events in the world today, a very considerable mass of information, excellently organized and analytically interpreted. The author is well qualified to do such a work. He is a Russian specialist of note. He has not been content to write from sources available in this country, but has travelled extensively and carried on personal "on the ground" research. He is perhaps immediately and best known to the student of Russian history as the author of the excellent *Introduction to Russian History and Culture* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1949), *The Golden Age of Russian Literature*, and as the editor of *Soviet Press Translations* from 1946 to 1950. Professor Spector is Associate Professor of Russian Civilization and Literature at the University of Washington and is thoroughly acquainted with Russian and Arabic language and traditions.

In ten chapters of 328 pages, Professor Spector narrates and explains the four hundred-odd years of Russian expansion at the expense of the Muslim world, the opening guns of the Soviet against the West and its base in Asia and the Muslim world, the Baku Congress on 1920—then area by area the same simple, yet

analytical, treatment is applied to Russian relations with Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Arab countries. The discussion is divided into three periods—1917-26, 1927-41, and 1941-58. The entire work is concluded and applied in his chapters on the "Soviet Cultural Impact on the Muslim World and Conclusions."

The excellence of Professor Spector's accomplishment is marred, however, by some physical defects which need not have been allowed. The documentation is copious, but is placed at the end of the book. This may be an inexpensive measure, but the patience of the scholar is severely tried by the necessity of continual interruption of the thought development in order to turn to the end of the book for footnotes. The printing job is amateurish—not at all in proportion to the stature of the author or the excellence of his work. The pictures are poor, not well placed, and frequently appear to be out of focus. A work of this kind should not be deficient in maps; this one is. None of these defects, however, can seriously detract from the fact that this work remains, when all is said and done, an outstanding contribution to our understanding of a major area of the cold war.

Guy Bryan Harrison

Papal Thought on the State. Edited by Gerald F. Yates, S. J.
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1958. 139 pp.
\$.45 paper.

This is a useful digest of Roman Catholic thought on the problem of government authority, its genesis, purpose, and scope. While this book in the Crofts Classics contains only excerpts from encyclicals and other writings of popes since 1878, it is sufficiently informative on Rome's official position with regard to civil government, human liberty, democracy, race, the idea of a world community, and the Church's right to speak on social questions. While the Church of Rome firmly believes itself to be the only true Church and that it ought to occupy a privileged position within a given commonwealth, it is prudent enough to adapt itself to changing circumstances in the social or political sphere. Protestants cannot easily forget or overlook the brazen intolerance of Catholic hierarchs in Spain and some Latin American countries. Nevertheless we ought to remember that in Soviet Russia and

Nazi Germany both Catholic laymen and priests, like the Protestants of Germany during the rule of Adolf Hitler, have boldly defied the wiles of political totalitarianism. We think of the intrepid Count von Galen, Bishop of Munster, who again and again thundered from his pulpit against the injustices of Nazism. In March of 1945 there were still 1493 Catholic priests in the Dachau concentration camp. Humble priests and prelates like Dr. Carl Lampert were executed for their Christian stand against the brutalities of Nazidom. Pope Pius XI in his encyclical '*Mit brennender Sorge*' of 1937 laid bare the idolatrous pretensions of Nazi racial pride and the suppression of truth and justice. No one can read this document (pp. 68-80) without sensing the deep insight of the late pontiff into the dilemmas which Christians—Catholics and Evangelicals—faced in Nazi Germany. Yet, Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna and Cardinal Schuster of Milan seemingly got along well with the Nazi and Fascist contenders for power in their respective countries. Nor have we ever heard or read of the Roman Catholic Church's excommunicating either Hitler or Goebbels, both reared in the faith of the Roman Church. But also we do well to remember that some deluded Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian laymen and ministers have compromised the Christian faith by their endorsement of blatant racial prejudice and by their membership in White Citizens' Councils and the like.

With a Catholic now in the White House the dialogue is on between Catholics and Protestants on matters of church-state relations and the Christian's ultimate loyalty. May both sides state their positions fairly and honestly, and may we in the United States exemplify by precept and example our common solidarity as a people "under God" without compromise of conscience or Christian liberty, a liberty that must ever be disciplined by the obedience of faith in Jesus Christ, who is Lord of lords, and King of kings.

William A. Mueller

Prefaces to Liberty: Selected Writings of John Stuart Mill.
Edited by Bernard Wishy. Beacon Hill, Boston: Beacon Press, 1959. 367 pp. \$3.95.

This book is a selection of sixteen articles, letters, and monographs from the writings of John Stuart Mill, and is published as a tribute to Mill on the centenary of the publication of his famous

essay *On Liberty*. The writings cover a thirty-five year period during which time Mill socially and politically evolved from ardent Benthamism to a position that Mill rather paradoxically preferred to describe as "no system." With the exception of the last seven selections, all of the writings are from the pen of Mill when he was enjoying the intellectual vitality, enthusiasm, and associations that are characteristic of most men of his brilliance during their late teens and early twenties. These earlier writings are not so well known and the editor, Professor Wishy, is commended for including them as prefaces to one of the greatest of all prefaces to liberty, the essay *On Liberty*, which is the last selection in this volume.

Some of Mill's major theses around which the editor seems to have based his selections are as follows: (1) A person's moral and religious convictions, or lack of them, are of his own choosing, and thus cannot be prescribed or proscribed by any form of legislative action; (2) the concept and practice of justice in a democratic society entails the uninhibited dissemination of opinions and information pertaining to the interests and well-being of that society; and (3) the freedom to express one's views on any subject is an inalienable right, and the prohibition of such expression is possibly and potentially to deprive humanity of that truth toward which it has untiringly striven during the course of its development.

If one adopts the editor's reason as to why he chose these selections for a one-volume work, one would say that the chief merit of the volume is the inclusion of the earlier writings of Mill so that in reading the entire volume one can trace Mill's philosophical development. Yet this reviewer questions the editor's implied suggestion that Mill does a political and social "about face" over the years covered by this volume. Actually a careful reading of the earlier writings reveals that his last selection, *On Liberty*, is to a large extent elaborations of some of its author's political and social viewpoints which were formulated as early as his seventeenth year. The elaborations merely reflect more mature insight into certain social and political issues and reveal his awareness of some restrictions and limitations of a democratic society which he had previously overlooked.

One of the notable features of the volume is the editor's Introduction, especially its recurrent evaluation of Mill as one who was not only abreast of his age as evidenced by an accurate diagnosis of the social, economic, and political ills of his time,

but who set forth in clear and striking language the limitations of the growing democratic, liberal, and political institutions which were establishing themselves throughout the western world. In summary, the editor attributes to Mill the ability to see that the question concerning the limits of majority rule over the individual is a complex and intriguing one, but one to which a philosophical analysis cannot properly do justice.

My main criticism of the volume is that despite this otherwise excellent Introduction, the editor is somewhat misleading in some of his biographical comments. For example, after some discussion of Mill's life, together with a very penetrating insight into the social, cultural, and political milieu in which Mill's writings were published, the editor comments that

None of the issues Mill raises in these selections should be considered only in the light of general political theory. His ideas are closely connected with events in his private life—with his "mental crisis," for example, or his relations with Mrs. Taylor. They represent not only political doctrine, but also Mill's attempt to define his place in a society in which the role of the intellectual was rapidly changing.

One gets the impression here that some sort of psychological reductionism is being attempted. The editor seems to be explaining Mill's political astuteness in terms of nervous breakdowns, emotional reactions to British romanticism, and the influence of his constant female companion (later his wife), rather than giving due credit to Mill's own intellectual prowess. This overemphasis on psychoanalysis is partially diminished by the editor's contradictory statement to the effect that Mill's mental crisis produced "no dramatic or immediate change in his published political opinions."

Why is this book of peculiar significance for political theorists throughout the world in the centenary of the publication *On Liberty*? Before specifically answering this question it seems peculiarly significant that many contemporary theorists still hold one of the traditional positions that government (or the state, or society) is under obligation to provide opportunity to each citizen for the highest possible physical, mental, and spiritual development, because individual personality is the highest achievement of the social order. Included among theorists who have held a position similar to this in the past are such thinkers as Plato, Aris-

totle, Locke, Paine, Montesquieu, and even Spinoza. One who lists these men as holding such a viewpoint runs the risk of making of them philosophical bedfellows. Nonetheless, I shall take the further risk of placing under the ethico-politico coverlets with them the nineteenth century thinker, John Stuart Mill, for it is apparent that the essential purpose of Mill's political writings was to show not only the social value which results from political *laissez-faire*, but primarily the value definable in terms of worth, dignity, and integrity which accrues to an individual as a result of the absence of political restraints upon his intellectual and moral development. It seems apparent to this reviewer that the selections from Mill's writings which comprise this volume reflect this two-pronged purpose. Therefore, the book under review poses the same problems for us today that pervaded the "raw, undisciplined wasteful England of 1815" and the England of the latter part of the nineteenth century, and which were never adequately resolved by either the ardent enthusiasm of the Benthamite neophyte or the more mature philosophical insights of his later years. In other words, political theorists today are confronted with the realities of a social order in which the free and open intellectual "persuasion," that is supposedly the key to a minority becoming a majority, is looked upon as a threat to the legal, moral, and religious status quo, as well as to the very guarantees embedded in our constitution. This volume is to be taken seriously as a reminder that this free and open intellectual "persuasion" is as modern and contemporary as it was during Mill's day and time.

William G. Toland

Foundations of the Responsible Society. By Walter G. Muelder.
New York: Abingdon Press, 1959. 280 pp. \$6.00.

Walter G. Muelder in *Foundations of the Responsible Society* has provided a very practical introduction to the problems of a rapidly changing technological society. With great facility the author has cut across the disciplines of theology, philosophy, and the social sciences in developing the idea of a responsible society in which man under God is the unit of co-operation. As Muelder casts the person into the universal social milieu, the reader finds

himself grasping for a more specific identification of the human entity. Perhaps the institutions of world culture would have taken on new meaning if the dynamics of personality had been made more explicit in the early chapters. Rather late in the development of the idea of responsible society one discovers that Muelder is actually casting personality in the Gestalt mold. Worthy deference is given to the religious dimensions in the development of the primary thesis. He employs them skillfully to unmask the pseudoethical and hypocritical elements in totalitarian regimes. Whether the author is dealing with the ethical reality of the state, social foundations of civil law, agricultural policy, or vocation, he takes the Christian perspective. In fact, the whole book is made cohesive by positing the response of the Christian to modern welfare and power on man's responsibility to God. Perhaps this is the point at which the book speaks most poignantly. Within this frame of reference five groups of problems are proposed: the challenges of concepts which tend to shift personal responsibility to the state, state intervention in economic life, governmental intervention in social relationships, development and maintenance of law, and problems of governmental intervention into cultural affairs.

The understandable inability of anyone to deal with authority in the wide range of academic disciplines has required that Professor Muelder document his work by quoting freely from numerous publications of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. and the World Council of Churches.

The glossary in the *Foundations of the Responsible Society* is non-technical, the style is readable, and the content is provocative. The range of problems which are attacked in this inquiry will, no doubt, interest Christian readers in most every discipline.

John B. Davidson

The Structure of Nations and Empires. By Reinhold Niebuhr. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1959, 306 pp. \$5.00.

In this work Reinhold Niebuhr turns his brilliant powers of analysis of society to the structure of the present political situation of the world. His method is historical and analytical. He studies the structure of political organization in the West, with

some slight attention to the East, and then applies his findings to the contemporary scene.

Niebuhr finds that peoples are always organized politically into either autonomous nations or into empires. Either form inevitably pretends a great deal more in the way of freedom, prosperity, and general happiness than is ever achieved. The fact is that force is necessary to political existence, which necessitates some inequities and injustices. A primary problem is the wise and equitable use of force.

In our time empires have been discredited, and they are looked upon as oppressive, exploitative, and domineering. This is a time of empire smashing and of liberation of subject peoples to self direction and freedom. Also, there is present the ideal of democratic relations among equal sovereign nations. This is the ideal. The fact is, however, that nations are not equal and that empires have not passed away. While the United States and the Soviet Union pretend to be champions of these ideals, they are in fact the leaders of clusters of nations, and they exercise a new form of imperial power over them. This is not to say that discriminations are not to be made between the two empires, because there are vast differences. However, not all of the evil is on the side of Russia with all of perfection on the side of the U.S.

Niebuhr fears the utopianism and the fanaticism that are present in the democratic crusade of the U.S. and the communistic crusade of the Soviets. Each side still pretends to have perfect solutions to the ills of the world. The U.S. is more realistic and less utopian and fanatical, but it still believes that peoples can progress to a state of abundance and happiness with a minimum of strife and use of force. The Soviets are extremely utopian and fanatical, believing that communism must triumph and that it will result in a classless society where there will be no economic warfare for control of the means of production. Then political force and the state will disappear and the peoples of the earth will live in prosperity, mutuality, and happiness.

Niebuhr believes that these two political philosophies are not only in opposition, but that each is committed to the suppression and extermination of the other. Each is self-righteous and crusading and believes that the forces of ultimate reality are on its side. Each side has tremendous material and intellectual resources, as well as people, at its disposal. Furthermore, each side has the technical skills and the tools for creating and using weapons

capable of virtual destruction of civilization and the race of man. The situation is therefore extremely critical.

What sort of solution does mankind have for this crisis? Unfortunately the situation is more easily analyzed than cured. Niebuhr is also in the position of being committed to the essential ideals of democracy and of being able to speak with any real effect only to the West. He proposes that we become realistic about political institutions. We must recognize that the U.S. exercises great economic and political control, that it is in effect an empire. We should not pretend that this is not the case. We should drop our self-righteousness and our utopianism and fanaticism. We should realize that society will always be morally ambiguous and that we can never reach anything more than proximate goals. We should enter realistically into the struggle for gaining the support of the uncommitted nations, which struggle we are now losing. Most of the rising nations cannot achieve either our economic level or our freedom of political institutions. We are unrealistic, therefore, in insisting that they profess our economic and political goals in order to merit our aid.

Niebuhr's analysis is brilliant and realistic, and his proposals are modest and helpful. Perhaps many will ask if there is anything uniquely Christian in his work. There is very little of an avowed Christian dimension, but it is nevertheless present. It certainly is in his realism about the imperfectability of man and of political institutions. He knows that man is an original sinner and that he lives in a broken and distorted society. But he is saved from despair or from acceptance of power and force without tempering them with love and justice. Not only are we sinners but we are made in the image of God and subjects of his love and grace. Therefore it is possible for us to achieve a good society on earth but not a perfect one.

Guy H. Ranson

Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy. By Kenneth W. Thompson. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1959. \$3.50.

Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy is an attempt to place in sharp focus a major problem facing the

Western statesman. Much has been said concerning the application of Christian ethical principles to foreign policy; however, much less has been written about the problems arising from such application. Kenneth W. Thompson points up the problems facing one who would delve into this highly controversial area of thought, and admits that a choice must be made concerning the attitude in which he approaches the subject. The author begins "with the proposition that one of our supreme tasks in foreign policy is to bring moral purpose and political realities into line and to understand their relationships more deeply and in terms that carry meaning for men in other lands."

In explaining some of the imperatives and ambiguities Dr. Thompson gives the views of three contemporary thinkers on the interrelation of mundane political and Christian ethics.

Judge Charles de Visscher of Belgium, Catholic philosopher, holds that "the world hopes for but does not possess genuine world community; . . . that neither politics nor law will ensure equilibrium and peace in the world without the 'moral infrastructure' . . ." and he calls "for a transvaluation of the present structure in terms of a drastic change in the modern conception of the state and its power."

A second thinker, Reinhold Niebuhr, Protestant theologian, political philosopher, and precursor of the realistic school of thought in international politics, also deals with the problem. Niebuhr holds that international society rests fundamentally on man as history reveals him, and that "the practice of rooting political and legal theory in political institutions and processes rather than probing deeper into the level of human nature has been a peculiar affliction of international law and relations theory." In discussing the dilemmas of man, Niebuhr constructs a rational theory of the behavior of states based on the primacy of their interests, but goes beyond the realists to concern himself with the establishment of a normative theory in order to avert the abyss of moral cynicism inherent in a merely national theory.

Winston S. Churchill, great British leader, also finds in human nature the foundation of his theories. All that may be hoped for in international affairs is a "relatively stable equilibrium" among the major powers. Churchill insisted on the moral dignity of national interest.

Dr. Thompson addresses himself very forcefully to the difficulties arising from the application of Christian ethics to the

problems of armaments, colonialism, and diplomacy. His search for relevant norms in Judaeo-Christian realism is made most vital by the frustration of the Cold War. According to Dr. Thompson, for men and states, the search for justice and morality is a bewildering, frustrating, and uncertain task.

It is the conviction of the reviewer that this volume adds greatly to the literature concerning the problem of foreign policy. It should caution those who would seek an easy solution to their problem of applied Christian ethics in international affairs.

Erwin C. Buell

NOTES ON CHURCH-STATE AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES

President Kennedy's federal aid plan's exclusion of federal subsidy to parochial schools has been greeted with both strong criticism and praise. Bishop Lawrence J. Shehan, chairman of the Catholic Welfare Conference's department of education, expressed "keen disappointment" at the exclusion of any school child from the benefits of the program. Other Catholic comment has been similarly critical of the "discrimination" involved in the plan. On the other hand, Protestant and Jewish reaction has been virtually unanimous in registering approval. One of the most emphatic statements of support came from Mr. Glenn L. Archer, as spokesman for Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, who said: "We congratulate the President for declaring that federal aid to church schools at the elementary and secondary levels is unconstitutional. This is the kind of loyalty to campaign pledges which we admire."

In February the United States Supreme Court followed the precedent of the 1947 *Everson* "school bus" case by refusing, by a seven-to-two vote, to review a bus suit arising in Newton, Connecticut, "for want of a substantial Federal question." It had been hoped that the Court might be willing to reconsider the position taken in the *Everson* case.

Vermont's Supreme Court has handed down a unanimous decision in *Stewart v. South Burlington* holding the payment of local tax funds for tuition of those attending Catholic high schools to be unconstitutional although the township paying the tuition had no public high school of its own. The court distinguished the payments in the case from scholarships or awards of merit. The opinion took notice of the burden imposed upon Catholic parents in supporting both public and parochial education, but concluded that, "the same fundamental law which protects the liberty of a parent to reject the public system in the interests of his child's spiritual welfare, enjoins the state from participating in the religious education he has selected."

The New York state legislature has enacted the so-called Speno law making it mandatory rather than optional for school districts

to provide free bus transportation to parochial as well as public schools.

Thomas D. Bailey, superintendent of public schools of the State of Florida, has defended such practices as Bible reading in assemblies and classrooms, distribution of Bibles and other religious material at school, and the practice of prayer before meals against the contention that such religious practices are violative of both the Federal and Florida Constitutions. Mr. Bailey emphasized, however, that he did not condone partisan, sectarian proselytizing in the schools for any one particular religion against others. In this connection, a privately conducted state-wide poll taken for the Miami *Herald* revealed that 79.5 per cent of families interviewed favored nonsectarian Bible reading in the public schools. 84.8 per cent of Protestants interviewed expressed favor for the Bible reading, 67.2 per cent of Catholics, and 39.5 per cent of Jews.

A new Catholic "Citizens for Educational Freedom" has recently been organized to exert pressure for making public funds available for parochial schools. The slogan of the nation-wide lay group is "A Fair Share for Every Child." It is reported that major emphasis will be placed upon such arguments as: Catholic schools are entitled to government aid due to the fact that they educate about one-ninth of all elementary and high-school students; Catholics are being unfairly subjected to "double taxation" in being required to support both public and private schools; and aid should be given not to church groups as such, but rather to the child and his parents to meet educational expenses.

A survey of the religious affiliation of the governors of the American states reveals that each has a church membership. According to the study, denominational affiliations include six Lutherans, five Presbyterians, four members of the United Church of Christ, three Episcopalians, and one each from the Disciples of Christ and Mormons. Catholics, Methodists, and Baptists numbered ten each.

The American Lutheran Church formed by merging the American, Evangelical, and United Evangelical Lutheran groups is among the top ten largest Protestant denominations in the United States, claiming a membership of 2,258,092.

The United States Post Office Department has held that the postmaster of Burlington, Vermont, exceeded his authority when he canceled, during the Presidential election, the religious mailing

privilege of a minister of a local Church of Christ. The controversy arose over the circulation of a pamphlet entitled "A Roman Catholic President?" which the postmaster contended was "actually political" rather than "religious."

An interesting commentary on this motorized age is found in an appeal made to the United States Supreme Court to review the refusal of the city of San Marino, California, to change zoning regulations to allow the use of a lot near a large Catholic church for a playground for the parochial school on weekdays and for a parking lot on Sunday. The contention was made by attorneys of the church that to deny use of a parking lot to a church in the heavily populated Los Angeles area is in effect to deny freedom of assembly for worship. Neither California courts nor the United States Supreme Court accepted the argument.

The Baptist General Association of Virginia has gone on record as being opposed to the participation of churches and denominational agencies "in business enterprises that are not directly church-related."

Five ordained Protestant ministers are at present members of the United States House of Representatives. They are: Representatives Merwin Coad (Disciples of Christ); Walter H. Moeller (Lutheran, Missouri Synod); Adam Clayton Powell (Baptist); Robert A. Bartel (Baptist); and Henry Shadeberg (Congregationalist).

Dr. Winthrop S. Hudson, distinguished author and James B. Colgate Professor of the History of Christianity at the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, delivered the 1961 Dawson Lectures on Church and State at the Second Annual Conference on Church and State at Baylor University, March 13-16, 1961. The lectures were titled, "The Church in Colonial America."

"Church-State Aspects of the Christian's Involvement in Human Need" has been announced as the subject for the Fifth Annual Religious Liberty Conference to be held in Washington, D.C., October 4-5, 1961, under the auspices of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs.

OVERSEAS:

A spokesman for the German Evangelical Church states that Protestant church newspapers have been confiscated by the Communist government of East Germany. The repressive action was

taken because the newspapers printed announcements of a national church convention to be held in West Berlin, July 10-23.

Representatives of the Vatican and the Austrian government have recently signed an agreement by which Austria will grant \$4,000,000 annually to the Roman Catholic Church in that country. The agreement brought to a successful conclusion a ten-year effort to reinstate the Austrian-Vatican concordat of 1934.

The *Toronto Daily Star*, Canada's largest newspaper, has attacked programs of religious instruction as they are presently conducted in the public schools. The newspaper noted the bitterness and apprehension created by the inclusion of the subject in the curriculum in schools which are "supposed to be public, without distinction of race and creed."

An investigation has been ordered in Puerto Rico in connection with the activities of the Roman Catholic Church and its Christian Action Party in last fall's elections in that country to determine whether the free exercise of the voting franchise was violated.

The New Zealand House of Representatives has considered and turned down a bill to permit religious instruction in the public schools of that country. The action was taken notwithstanding considerable pressure exerted by advocates of inclusion of the instruction.

The leader of the Australian Labor Party has announced that all members of that party are committed to oppose state aid for parochial schools. The policy was denounced by Auxiliary Bishop Leslie Carrol of the Roman Catholic Church as "un-Australian in operation and un-British in concept."

Bitter debate has taken place in Burma over a proposed constitutional amendment which would make Buddhism the state religion. Eighty per cent of Burma's population of 20,250,000 is Buddhist. Approximately 600,000 are Protestants with somewhat more Moslems. There are in excess of 177,000 Roman Catholics. Official representatives of the non-Buddhists have fought the measure vehemently.

In Greece two members of the Pentecostal Church of Prophecy have been tried and given suspended sentences on the charge that they had proselytized by the distribution of evangelical pamphlets to fellow villagers of Vayea.

The Ceylon government has announced that religious schools in the country will be taken over by the government as public schools.

Buddhism is the predominant religion of Ceylon, and most of the church-supported schools are Christian.

A Lutheran pastor in Eskilstuna, Sweden, has been fined for refusing to marry a couple, one of whom was a divorced person. The pastor contended that in refusing to perform the marriage he was obeying the dictates of his conscience, but the court held that as a minister of the State Lutheran Church he was bound by the civil law to perform a marriage if one of the parties is a parishioner because in this situation the minister was considered to be a "civil servant bound by the civil law."

R. T. M.

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